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What's Wrong with Involuntary Manslaughter?
Stephen P. Garvey*
Efforts to explain when and why the state can legitimately impose
retributive punishment on an actor who inadvertently creates an unjustified risk
of causing death (and death results) typically rely on one of two theories. The
prior-choice theory claims that retributive punishment for inadvertent lethal risk
creation is justified if and only if the actor's inadvertence or ignorance was a
but-for and proximate result of a prior culpable choice. The hypothetical-choice
theory claims that retributive punishment for inadvertent lethal risk creation is
justified if and only if the actor would have chosen to take the risk if he had been
aware of it, even though he was not in fact aware of it.
I argue that neither of these theories satisfactorily identifies when and why
retributive punishment is warranted for inadvertent lethal risk creation. Instead,
I propose that an actor who creates a risk of causing death, but who was un-
aware of that risk, can fairly be subject to retributive punishment if he was either
nonwillfully ignorant or self-deceived with respect to the existence of the risk,
and if such ignorance or self-deception was due to the causal influence of a de-
sire he could and should have controlled. The culpability of such an actor
consists, not in any prior actual choice to do wrong, nor in any imagined hypo-
thetical choice to do wrong, but in the culpable failure to exercise doxastic self-
control: control over one's beliefs.
Walter and Bernice Williams were loving parents. They were also
convicted of letting their fourteen-month-old son die of pneumonia.' The
Williamses said they never realized their son's life was in danger, and
indeed, the state of Washington never claimed otherwise. It wanted to
punish them anyway. But if the Williamses never realized their son's life
was in danger, how can they fairly be punished for endangering it? If we
punish them nonetheless, why do we punish them? What do we punish them
for?
* Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. Thanks to Robert Blecker, John Blume, Steven
Clymer, Valerie Hans, James Henderson, Kenneth Simons, Sheri Johnson, and Trevor Morrison for
helpful comments.
1. State v. Williams, 484 P.2d 1167, 1174 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971). The case is reproduced in a
number of criminal law casebooks. See, e.g., KATE E. BLOCH & KEVIN C. MCMUNIGAL,
CRIMINAL LAW 392-95 (2005); JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW
296-99 (3d ed. 2003); SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES 445-48 (6th ed. 1995); JOHN KAPLAN, ROBERT WEISBERG & GUYORA BINDER,
CRIMINAL LAW 370-73 (5th ed. 2004); CYNTHIA LEE & ANGELA HARRIS, CRIMINAL LAW 425-29
(2005); LLOYD L. WEINREB, CRIMINAL LAW 290-91 (7th ed. 2003). For a fictionalized account
offering a similar fact pattern, see Norval Morris, The Watching Brief 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1215
(1987).
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Walter Williams was described as a "24-year-old full-blooded Sheshont
Indian with a sixth-grade education.,,2 Bernice was described as a "20-year-
old part Indian with an 11 th grade education.",3 In the fall of 1968, their in-
fant son became ill.4 Walter and Bernice realized he was ill but thought he
had a simple toothache.5 They gave him aspirin, believing that was all they
needed to do.6
The boy was in truth suffering from "an abscessed tooth," which
"develop[ed] into an infection of the mouth and cheeks, eventually becoming
gangrenous." 7 The infection emitted the odor characteristic of gangrene,
8
and the boy's cheek "turned 'a bluish color like.' 9 Unable to eat, the child
became malnourished and eventually died of pneumonia.'0 Medical testi-
mony established that he would have survived had he received adequate
medical care at least one week prior to his death." But he never received
such care. 12 His parents failed to secure it for him.
The Williamses were physically and financially able to take the boy to a
doctor.' 3 In fact, Walter had taken him to a doctor for medical attention ear-
lier in the year.' 4 Yet on this occasion they did not seek help.1 5 Believing
the child was suffering from nothing but a toothache, Walter testified that
given "the way the cheek looked, . . . and that stuff on his hair, [the welfare
authorities] would think we were neglecting him and take him away from us
and not give him back."' 6 Bernice echoed her husband's fear,'7 and indeed,
they had good reason to be afraid. Welfare authorities were at the time quick
2. Williams, 484 P.2d at 1169. For present purposes I assume that the Williamses had the
cognitive capacity to realize their son's life was in danger, despite their limited education. In other
words, I assume their limited cognitive abilities were not so severe as to have rendered them
incapable of realizing their son's life was in danger based on the evidence available to them at the
time they should have acted but failed to do so.
3. Id, at 1170.
4. Id. The child's name was Walter Joseph Tabafunda. Id. Walter Williams was not the
child's biological father, nor had he adopted the child. Id. at 1172. According to the appellate
court, however, the "evidence show[edl that he had assumed responsibility with his wife for the
care and maintenance of the child, whom he greatly loved." Id.
5. Id. at 1170.
6. Id. at 1174.
7. Id. at 1173.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1174.
10. Id. at 1173.
11. Id. at 1173-74.
12. Id. at 1170.
13. Id. at 1174.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1170.
16. Id. at 1174 (internal quotations omitted).
17. Id.
[Vol. 85:333
HeinOnline -- 85 Tex. L. Rev. 334 2006-2007
What's Wrong with Involuntary Manslaughter?
to remove Native American children from their families and place them with
non-Native American families.18
Charged with what is usually described as involuntary manslaughter 19 or
negligent homicide,20 the trial court expressly found that the Williamses "did
not realize how sick the baby was. 21 Moreover, the court found that the
Williamses "loved the baby., 22  Nonetheless, their failure to realize their
son's life was in danger when a "man of reasonable prudence under the same
or similar conditions, 23 would have realized the risk, coupled with their fail-
ure to take the baby to a doctor when they were obligated to do so, added up
18. See William Byler, Removing Children: The Destruction ofAmerican Indian Families, C.R.
DIG., Summer 1977, at 19, 19 ("In the State of Washington, the Indian adoption rate is 19 times
greater and the foster care rate 10 times greater [than for non-Indian children].").
19. Washington law at the time of the Williams case denominated this offense "manslaughter."
See State v. Williams, 484 P.2d 1167, 1171 & n.2 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971). The appellate court
emphasized that manslaughter under Washington law required only "simple" or "ordinary"
negligence, in contrast to "gross" or "criminal" negligence associated with involuntary
manslaughter at common law. Id. at 1171. Consequently, the case might have come out differently
if Washington law had required gross or criminal negligence in order to sustain a conviction for
manslaughter. The distinction between civil and criminal negligence is in any event an elusive one.
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.4 cmt. 2, at 83 (1980) ("While some of the earliest negligent
homicide statutes required only ordinary negligence for criminal liability, the trend has been to
require something more, though ... the 'something more' typically was not described with
precision. The same is true of judicial decisions on the subject."); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL
LAW § 3.7(b), at 249 (3d ed. 2000) ("Though the legislatures and the courts have often made it clear
that criminal liability generally requires more fault than the ordinary negligence which will do for
tort liability, they have not so often made it plain just what is required in addition to tort
negligence .... "). The Model Penal Code provides that an actor's failure to perceive a risk does
not rise to the level of culpable negligence unless the actor's failure amounts to a "gross deviation
from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation." MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (1962). According to some commentators, this gross-deviation
requirement embodies the Code's effort to distinguish criminal from civil negligence. See, e.g.,
MARKUS D. DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW: MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.2(C)(iv), at 78 n.88 (2002); Peter
W. Low, The Model Penal Code, the Common Law, and Mistakes of Fact: Recklessness,
Negligence, or Strict Liability?, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 539, 545-46 (1988).
20. The Model Penal Code does not use the term "involuntary manslaughter." It distinguishes
instead between "manslaughter," which involves the conscious disregard of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk of causing death (with death resulting), and "negligent homicide," which involves
the failure to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk of causing death (with death resulting).
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(l)(a) (1962) (defining "manslaughter"); id. § 210.4 (defining
"negligent homicide"). The common law drew no distinction between manslaughter and negligent
homicide so defined, treating both as cases of "involuntary manslaughter." See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 210.4 cmt. 1, at 81 (1980) ("[I]nvoluntary manslaughter [at common law] was a catch-all
offense that did not distinguish between recklessness and negligence ...."); cf ROLLIN M. PERKINS
& RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 107 (3d ed. 1982) (stating that awareness of risk was an
element to be considered in determining if negligence was criminal but further stating that
"[w]hether [at common law] negligence [was] criminal or ordinary... depend[ed] not upon the
element of awareness but upon the degree of the negligence").
21. Williams, 484 P.2d at 1170.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1174.
2006]
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to involuntary manslaughter.24 The Williamses were sentenced to three years
imprisonment, with their sentences suspended.2
The case can elicit a range of responses.26 On the one hand, you might
think that the Williamses did realize that failing to take their son to a doctor
would jeopardize his life, despite their claims to the contrary. You might
also think that the Williamses had no good reason to take that risk. If so,
then the Williamses were guilty of reckless homicide, not simply involuntary
manslaughter. They took a risk, and the risk they took was one the law did
not permit them to take. Alternatively, you might think that the Williamses
were justified in risking their son's life, since going to the doctor meant tak-
ing a risk of losing him to the welfare authorities. The law should have
allowed the Williamses to risk the child's life in order to avoid the risk of
having him taken away. If so, then the Williamses should have been
acquitted. They did nothing the law should forbid.
On the other hand, you might think that the Williamses were telling the
truth when they said that they did not realize their son's life was in danger.
You might nonetheless also think that the Williamses should have seen the
risk because a reasonable person in their situation would have seen it. If so,
then the actual outcome of the case was the right one. The Williamses were
guilty of involuntary manslaughter. Alternatively, you might think that a
reasonable person in the Williamses' situation would not have realized their
son's life was in danger. If so, then the Williamses should have been
acquitted. They believed as a reasonable person would have believed, and
the criminal law has no business punishing them.
All these reactions take for granted that the state can, at least under
some circumstances, legitimately punish inadvertent risk creation. But ac-
cording to one prominent school of thought, sometimes known as choice
retribution, 27 this assumption is mistaken. On this view an actor can legiti-
mately be punished only if he deserves to be punished, and an actor deserves
to be punished only if he has freely chosen to act in a way the state demands
he refrain from acting or not to act in a way it demands he act.28  If the
24. Id.
25. PAUL H. ROBINSON, WOULD YOU CONVICT? SEVENTEEN CASES THAT CHALLENGED THE
LAW 142 (1999).
26. See id. at 140-41 (reporting results of a survey based on the facts of the Williams case
finding that "[t]hirty-seven percent of the people would impose no punishment, but 45 percent
would impose a substantial punishment of a year or more in prison").
27. Theorists typically contrast choice retribution with character retribution. Choice retribution
holds that the punishment an actor deserves depends on the choices he has made. Character
retribution holds that the punishment an actor deserves depends on the character he has revealed
through the choices he has made. See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
28. See infra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing choice retribution). Although I will
hereafter usually speak in terms of an actor choosing to act so as to create a lethal risk, this way of
speaking should be understood to include mutatis mutandis cases in which an actor chooses not to
act when he is under an obligation to act, and thereby fails to extinguish such a risk, as in the
Williams case itself.
[Vol. 85:333
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pertinent demand is to refrain from imposing on others an unjustified risk of
causing death, how can an actor who sees no such risk in what he is doing be
said to have chosen to take that risk and thus to have chosen to act in a way
the law demands he refrain from acting? A choice retributivist would there-
fore seem to have no choice: The Williamses must be let go.
Nonetheless, at least some cases involving the inadvertent creation of a
lethal risk do seem to evoke a retributive response, even if the basis for such
a response is obscure. Take Sam and Tiffany.29 Like Walter and Bernice,
their child is very ill. Unlike Walter and Bernice, Sam and Tiffany are well-
educated and well-to-do. They are also single-minded social climbers.
Imagine further that Sam and Tiffany have some inkling that their child's
illness poses a threat to his life, 30 but they never actually come consciously to
believe that his life is in danger. Imagine finally that the reason they fail to
form that belief is because they have become preoccupied with planning the
"party of the decade.",3' Failing to see the risk to their child's life, they do
nothing to dissipate it, and the child dies.
Different people will react differently to the facts surrounding the death
of Sam and Tiffany's child, just as they do to the facts surrounding the death
of Walter and Bernice's. Some might believe neither couple deserves re-
tributive punishment; others might believe both do. But what if your
intuition tells you to punish Sam and Tiffany but not Walter and Bernice?
Does a normatively defensible distinction exist between the two cases? In
other words, if some cases of involuntary manslaughter warrant retributive
punishment, but no cases of involuntary manslaughter involve a conscious
choice to risk causing death, then when, if at all, is retributive punishment for
the inadvertent creation of a lethal risk warranted, and why?
The answer I propose is this: An actor who creates a risk of causing
death but who was unaware of that risk is fairly subject to retributive pun-
ishment if he was either nonwillfully ignorant or self-deceived with respect to
the existence of the risk, and if such ignorance or self-deception was due to
the causal influence of a desire he should have controlled. The culpability of
such an actor does not consist in any choice to do wrong, but rather in the
culpable failure to exercise doxastic self-control, i.e., control over desires
that influence the formation and awareness of one's beliefs. An actor who is
nonwillfully ignorant allows desire to preclude him from forming the belief
that he is imposing a risk of death when the evidence available to him
29. This hypothetical is based on DRESSLER, supra note 1, at 301-02, which is based in turn on
the hypothetical in Larry Alexander, Reconsidering the Relationship Among Voluntary Acts, Strict
Liability, and Negligence in Criminal Law, 7 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 84, 100 (1990) [hereinafter
Alexander, Reconsidering the Relationship]. See Larry Alexander, Insufficient Concern: A Unified
Conception of Criminal Culpability, 88 CAL. L. REv. 931, 950 (2000) [hereinafter Alexander,
Insufficient Concern], for a reprised version of his original hypothetical.
30. As explained later, this "inkling" would more precisely be described either as a suspicion or
as an unconscious belief that the child's life was in danger.
31. DRESSLER, supra note 1, at 301.
2006]
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supports the formation of that belief, while an actor who is self-deceived
forms that belief but allows desire to prevent him from becoming aware of it.
In either case the actor could and should have controlled the wayward desire,
thereby allowing the relevant belief to form and surface into awareness.
Before the actor's exercise of doxastic self-control, his cognitive state
can be depicted as follows, where the belief that p is the actor's belief that his
conduct is creating a lethal risk.
Non-willful ignorance
(conscious suspicion that p)
.. ....... -- Desire
Conscious belief that p
"i' 4 - Desire
Self-deception
(unconscious belief thatp)
Before the exercise of doxastic self-control
Desire prevents the formation of the conscious belief that the actor is
creating a lethal risk. In contrast, the actor's cognitive state after the exercise
of doxastic self-control might be depicted as follows, where the exercise of
doxastic self-control cuts off the influence of desire and allows the actor to
form the conscious belief that he is creating a lethal risk.
Doxastic
self-control
Non-willful ignorance
(conscious suspicion that p)
4 4- Desire
Conscious belief that p
* 4 Desire
Self-deception
(unconscious belief that p)
Doxastic
self-control
After the exercise of doxastic self-control
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Thus the fact-assuming it to be a fact-that the Williamses never
consciously believed their son's life was in danger is not enough to inoculate
them against retributive punishment. On one plausible reading of the facts,
the Williamses either suspected their son's life was in danger, though they
did not believe it was, or they believed his life was in danger, though they
remained unaware of that belief. They were, in other words, either nonwill-
fully ignorant or self-deceived. In either case the cognitive state in which
they found themselves was the result of desire. They did not want con-
sciously to believe that their inaction presented any risk to their son's life,
because if they did so believe, they would have had to choose between risk-
ing the child's life and risking his loss to the state. They did not want to face
that choice. Nonetheless, their ignorance was at least arguably excusable, for
the desire blinding them to the truth was the desire not to lose a child they
dearly loved.
In contrast, excusing Sam and Tiffany would be misplaced. If we
assume that they too were either nonwillfully ignorant or self-deceived with
respect to the existence of the risk to their child's life, then like the
Williamses, they should have exercised doxastic self-control so as to form
the conscious belief that their child's life was in danger. Yet unlike the
Williamses, the desire blinding them to the truth was not one the law should
excuse. The desire not to lose one's child is one thing. The desire to move
one step higher on the social ladder is another. Yet if Sam and Tiffany are
punished, they are punished not because they possessed that desire. They are
punished because they failed to control the influence of that desire on their
ability to form the conscious belief that their son's life was in jeopardy.
The argument unfolds in three Parts. Part I identifies as precisely as
possible what it is that distinguishes involuntary manslaughter from reckless
homicide. Part II explores two theories that attempt to reconcile liability for
involuntary manslaughter with retribution's commitment to liability based on
choice. Neither provides a satisfactory way to separate cases in which pun-
ishment for the inadvertent creation of a lethal risk is warranted from those in
which it is not. Part III argues that retributive punishment for such unwitting
risk creation is warranted if and because the actor's failure to perceive the
lethal risk is due to a culpable failure to exercise doxastic self-control.
I. Involuntary Manslaughter and Reckless Homicide
According to the Model Penal Code, involuntary manslaughter
(negligent homicide in the Code's terminology32) and reckless homicide
(manslaughter in the Code's terminology 33) both involve an actor who
32. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.4 (1962).
33. Id. § 210.3.
2006]
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creates an unjustified risk of causing death.34 But in the Code's hierarchy of
homicide offenses, involuntary manslaughter is a lesser offense deserving of
less punishment.35 So what distinguishes involuntary manslaughter from
reckless homicide, making the former deserving of less punishment than the
latter?
According to the Code, an actor is guilty of reckless homicide when he
"recklessly" causes the death of another human being.36 An actor is
"reckless" with respect to a result element of an offense, such as the death of
another human being, "when he consciously disregards a substantial and un-
justifiable risk that [death] ... will result from his conduct. ' 37 Moreover, the
"risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and
purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its dis-
regard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-
abiding person would observe in the actor's situation.,
38
The Code's definition of reckless homicide, which incorporates its
definition of recklessness, is no model of clarity. 39 The questions it raises are
many. For example, what is the relationship between the requirement that
the risk be "substantial and unjustifiable," and that which requires the risk to
be such that its disregard involves a "gross deviation" from the "standard of
conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation"?
Does the second clause define, or perhaps refine, in what a "substantial and
unjustifiable" risk consists,40 or does it state a separate and independent
requirement? 41  In either case, must the risk be both substantial and
34. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.4 cmt. 1, at 81 (1980) ("[T]he reckless actor must
consciously disregard' a substantial and unjustifiable homicidal risk created by his conduct,
whereas the negligent actor need only disregard a risk of which he 'should be aware."'); id. § 210.3
cmt. 3 at 51 ("[T]here must be a substantial and unjustifiable risk of homicide to establish
recklessness .... ).
35. The Code grades negligent homicide as a third degree felony, id. § 210.4(2), and reckless
homicide as a second degree felony. Id. § 210.3(2).
36. Id. § 210.3(l)(a).
37. Id. § 2.02(2)(c). For a helpful comparison between the Model Penal Code definition of
recklessness and the various then-extant state law definitions of recklessness, see David M.
Treiman, Recklessness and the Model Penal Code, 9 AM. J. CRIM. L. 281 app. II, at 376 (1981).
38. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1962). English law distinguishes between
"advertent recklessness" (also known as "Cunningham recklessness") and "inadvertent
recklessness" (also known as "Caldwell recklessness"). See, e.g., ANDREW ASHWORTH,
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW § 5.3(c), at 180-87 (3d ed. 2003).
39. The most thorough analysis of the Code's definition of reckless of which I am aware is
Treiman, supra note 37. See Paul Robinson, Prohibited Risks and Culpable Disregard or
Inattentiveness: Challenge and Confusion in the Formulation of Risk-Creation Offenses, 4
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 367, 371-77 (2003), for a helpful exegesis of the Code's definition of
recklessness, and Kenneth W. Simons, Should the Model Penal Code's Mens Rea Provisions Be
Amended?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 179, 188-95 (2003), for a description of some of the problems
with the Code's definition of recklessness.
40. See, e.g., Treiman, supra note 37, at 329 (suggesting this interpretation as one possibility).
41. See, e.g., id. at 334 (concluding that the Code intended this interpretation but recognizing
that the language of the provision itself is ambiguous). Another interpretation of the relationship
between the two requirements would hold that the first asks whether the actor's reasons for taking
[Vol. 85:333
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unjustifiable, as the text of the definition alone would suggest,42 or is the sub-
stantiality of a risk nothing more than a factor to be considered in assessing
the risk's unjustifiablity, such that the risk's unjustifiability is really all that
matters in the end? 43  If substantiality and unjustifiability are separate
elements, what makes a risk substantial?
44
Finally, what exactly is it that the actor must "consciously disregard"?
Will disregard of any risk suffice? 45  Or must the actor also disregard the
risk's substantiality, whatever "substantial" turns out to mean?46 Or indeed,
must the actor disregard not only the risk's substantiality but also the fact that
the law considers the taking of it unjustifiable? 47 In all events, what does it
the risk render his taking of it justifiable or permissible, while the second asks whether the actor's
reasons for taking the risk, though not rendering its taking justifiable or permissible, nonetheless
render its taking excusable. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 126
(1998).
42. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1962) ("A person acts recklessly with respect to a
material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that the material element exists or will result from his conduct.").
43. See, e.g., Alexander, Insufficient Concern, supra note 29, at 934 ("[R]ecklessness consists
of imposing unjustifiable risks on others. The level of risk imposed will bear on its justifiability but
is not itself an independent criterion of recklessness.").
44. See, e.g., Treiman, supra note 37, at 337-38 (describing two possible interpretations of the
substantiality requirement); see also Joshua Dressier, Does One Mens Rea Fit All?. Thoughts on
Alexander's Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability, 88 CAL. L. REV. 955, 959 (2000) (arguing
that "substantial" should be read to modify "unjustifiable," such that the reckless actor is one who
believes he is taking a "substantially unjustified" risk). Another interpretation of the substantiality
requirement, akin to that of Dressier's, maintains that the requirement's function is to preclude
liability for the taking of a risk that, though unjustified, is nonetheless insubstantial inasmuch as the
taking of it would involve a "de minimis infraction[]" in the sense provided for in the Code. See
Treiman, supra note 37, at 337-38 ("The second function that the requirement of substantiality
might serve is as an exclusion of de minimis violations of the law."). The Code describes the
circumstances under which a court "shall dismiss a prosecution" if and because it finds the
defendant's conduct involves a de minimis infraction of the law in § 2.12. See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.12 (1962).
45. See, e.g., Treiman, supra note 37, at 361 (suggesting this interpretation as one possibility).
46. See Claire Finkelstein, Responsibility for Unintended Consequences, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
579, 594-95 (2005) (arguing that the reckless actor must be aware of the risk's substantiality);
Kenneth W. Simons, Culpability and Retributive Theory: The Problem of Criminal Negligence, 5 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 365, 383 n.48 (1994) [hereinafter Simons, Culpability and Retributive
Theory] (same); Kenneth W. Simons, Does Punishment for "Culpable Indifference" Simply Punish
for "Bad Character?," 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 219, 226 n.ll (2002) [hereinafter Simons, Bad
Character] (stating that the Model Penal Code's "cognitive criterion of recklessness ... require[s],
inter alia, that the actor subjectively believe that she is creating a substantial risk"); Treiman, supra
note 37, at 362 ("There is strong support for the view that the actor must be aware of a substantial
risk, not just any risk.").
47. Compare Alexander, Insufficient Concern, supra note 29, at 937 (awareness of risk's
unjustifiability not required), and Treiman, supra note 37, at 362 (arguing that the "actor need not
be aware that the risk is unjustifiable"), with Dressler, supra note 44, at 959 ("In my view, what
should justify a judgment of criminal recklessness is that the actor is aware that she is taking an
unjustifiable risk or, at the very least, is aware that there is a significant likelihood that her intended
conduct is unjustifiable..."), and Stephen Shute, Knowledge and Belief in the Criminal Law, in
CRIMINAL LAW THEORY 171, 182 (Stephen Shute & A.P. Simester eds., 2002)
("Subjectivists ... [should] extend the requirement for knowledge or belief to the actus reus
element that the risk is unjustified.").
20061
HeinOnline -- 85 Tex. L. Rev. 341 2006-2007
Texas Law Review
mean to "consciously disregard" anything, whatever it is that one must so
disregard?
48
For present purposes I must set these difficult interpretive questions to
one side. Nonetheless, because an analysis of involuntary manslaughter can-
not intelligibly proceed without some analysis of reckless homicide in place,
the analysis on which I will rely begins as follows. An actor is not guilty of
reckless homicide unless, based on the beliefs available to him at the time he
acts (his background beliefs), he forms the further belief that his act is creat-
ing a substantial risk of causing death (which belief I will hereafter refer to as
the belief that p), keeping in mind that even a very small chance of causing
death can fairly be characterized as "substantial." An actor is not reckless
Insofar the unjustifiability or impermissibility of the risk an actor takes is a question of law,
those who maintain that an otherwise reckless actor need not be aware of the fact that the law judges
his risk taking as unjustified or impermissible may do so on the ground that ignorance of the law is
no excuse. But many scholars have persuasively argued that ignorance of the law, or at least
reasonable ignorance of the law, should excuse, even if it now does not. See, e.g., Douglas Husak
& Andrew von Hirsch, Culpability and Mistake of Law, in ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW
157, 173 (Stephen Shute et al. eds., 1993) ("[A] defendant who is ignorant of the applicable legal
rule... should ordinarily ... be excused if his legal mistake was a reasonable one ... ; or... have
his punishment mitigated if he did not know but should have known of the conduct's illegality.");
Joshua Dressier, Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral Theory, New Excuses and the Model
Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 671, 708 (1988) ("[A]n excuse defense should be allowed whenever a
jury is satisfied that an actor's lack of knowledge or understanding of a penal law was a reasonable
one .... "). Consequently, according to this line of thought an actor should only be described as
reckless if he realized that the risk he was taking was legally unjustified or impermissible. Indeed,
on this view the fact that an actor is unaware of the risk he is taking is ultimately important because
and insofar that it causes him to be unaware of the fact that the risk he is taking is a risk the law
demands he not take. Cf Michael Zimmerman, Moral Responsibility and Ignorance, 107 ETHICS
410, 412 (1997) ("The ignorance that is directly relevant is [the actor's own] ignorance of his doing
something... wrong.").
48. Treiman, supra note 37, at 369-71 (noting the ambiguity of "conscious disregard").
Markus Dubber suggests that "conscious disregard" might be construed to require the actor to
"accept[] ... the risk actually manifesting itself." See DUBBER, supra note 19, § 4.2(C)(iii), at 75-
76. Consequently, Dubber argues that an actor who takes an unjustified risk believing it to be less-
than-practically-certain to result should only be considered reckless if he accepts the risk "actually
manifesting itself," whereas an otherwise similarly-situated actor who does not so accept the risk
should presumably be considered merely negligent. See id. § 4.2(C)(iii), at 74-76. In contrast,
Alan Michaels argues that an actor who takes an unjustified risk believing it to be less-than-
practically-certain to result should be considered reckless, whereas an otherwise similarly-situated
actor who accepts the risk should be treated as if he believed the risk were practically certain to
result. See Alan Michaels, Acceptance: The Missing Mental State, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 953, 955,
965-76 (1998). In other words, whereas Dubber suggests treating the accepting reckless actor as
"reckless" and the nonaccepting reckless actor as "negligent," Michaels would treat the accepting
reckless actor as "knowing" and the nonaccepting reckless actor as "reckless." Moreover, Dubber
and Michaels each seem to suggest that his position finds support in the German law concept of
bedingter Vorsatz, which is derived in turn from the Roman law concept of dolus eventualis. See
DUBBER, supra note 19, § 4.2(C)(iii), at 74; Michaels, supra, at 1024-28. See Greg Taylor,
Concepts ofIntention in German Law, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 99, 116 (2004), for an in-depth
examination of dolus eventualis in contemporary German law, which ultimately concludes that the
"concept... is ... irretrievably flawed," and Greg Taylor, The Intention Debate in German Law, 17
RATIO JURIS 346, 348-78 (2004), for a detailed discussion of the debate over dolus eventualis in the
German criminal law literature.
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simply because he could have formed the belief that p based on the beliefs
available to him at the time. The actor must actually form the belief that p.
Importantly, this analysis presupposes that the reckless actor's belief
that p possesses two key features. First, the belief must be a belief, and not
merely a suspicion.49 Or to put the point another way, the actor's belief that
p must be a full belief, and not merely a partial one. For a belief to qualify
as a (full) belief, and not merely as a suspicion (or partial belief), the actor
must hold that belief with some appropriate measure of confidence and lack
of doubt. If an actor lacks such confidence, or harbors such doubt, we would
not say that he believes that p. We would instead say that he suspects that p,
or something along those lines. Confidence and doubt are of course matters
of degree.50 The point at which an actor's suspicion (or partial belief) that p
ripens into a (full) belief that p is elusive, but some such point exists all the
same.
Second, the actor's belief must be a belief of which he is sufficiently
aware or conscious. Consciousness or awareness, like confidence and doubt,
are matters of degree.51 For present purposes it suffices to distinguish two
degrees or levels of awareness and two degrees or levels of unawareness:
reflective awareness, dispositional awareness, modest unawareness, and deep
unawareness. The first two of these states are states of awareness. An actor
is reflectively aware of his belief that p if and when that belief is at the fore-
front of, or present in, the actor's mind. Reflective awareness might also be
49. The distinction at issue here can be described in various ways. See, e.g., JONATHAN
ADLER, BELIEF'S OWN ETHICS 231 (2002) (describing the distinction in terms of full belief versus
partial or degrees of belief); MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS, AND PRACTICAL REASON
36-37 (1999) (describing the distinction in terms of flat-out belief versus degrees of confidence);
RICHARD FOLEY, WORKING WITHOUT A NET 141 (1993) (describing the distinction in terms of
degrees of belief); Shute, supra note 47, at 193 (describing the distinction in terms of belief versus
suspicion); RICHARD SWINBURNE, EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION 34-35 (2000) (describing the
distinction in terms of strong beliefs versus weak beliefs); ALAN R. WHITE, MISLEADING CASES
132 (1991) (describing the distinction in terms of belief versus suspicion). An actor can harbor
some doubt about the truth of a proposition p without thereby losing his belief that p, but at some
point his doubt must undermine his belief. Or to put the same point another way, while an actor can
suspect that not-p without thereby losing his belief that p, at some point his suspicion that not-p will
become large enough to undermine his belief that p. Some scholars would perhaps describe an
actor who suspects that not-p while nonetheless believing that p as having made a "reckless
mistake" with respect top when not-p is true. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW 263 (1997)
("A reckless mistake occurs when an actor is aware of a substantial risk that the required
circumstance exists-for example, he is aware of a substantial risk that the umbrella might not be
his, although he thinks it probably is."); Kenneth W. Simons, Exploring the Intricacies of the Lesser
Evils Defense, 24 LAW & PHIL. 645, 662 (2005) ("[T]o say that the actor makes a reckless mistake
is to say that he is aware of a significant risk that not-P, even though, all things considered, he
believes that P.").
50. See, e.g., Shute, supra note 47, at 182-87.
51. See, e.g., id. at 190. Or to be more precise, "[c]onsciousness is an on/off switch: a system is
either conscious or not. But once conscious, the system is a rheostat: there are different degrees of
consciousness." JOHN R. SEARLE, THE REDISCOVERY OF THE MIND 83 (1992).
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called occurrent awareness.5 2 In contrast, an actor is dispositionally aware of
his belief that p if and when bringing that belief to reflective awareness
would require nothing more than directing his attention to it.53 Moreover,
although not immediately present in the actor's mind, a belief with respect to
which an actor is dispositionally aware is nonetheless effective or operative
in guiding his conduct.
The next two states are states of unawareness. These states presuppose
that an actor can form a belief while remaining unaware of that belief, either
reflectively or dispositionally. Moreover, they presuppose that the actor is
unaware of the belief because desire causes him to be unaware of it. His de-
sire to remain unaware of the belief has managed to push it into the
unconscious. An actor is modestly unaware of his belief that p if and when
bringing that belief to reflective awareness would require some effort at self-
scrutiny or self-control beyond simply directing his attention to it. In
contrast, an actor is deeply unaware of his belief that p if and when bringing
that belief to reflective awareness would require considerable effort and out-
side help. A belief with respect to which an actor is deeply unaware is, one
might say, a repressed belief of the sort associated in popular imagination
with Freudian theory.5
4
With these additional distinctions in hand we can now say that an actor
guilty of reckless homicide is one who believes, and not merely suspects, that
his act is creating a risk of death, and not merely some lesser harm, where the
actor is reflectively or dispositionally aware of this belief,55 and the actor
52. See ROBERT AuDI, EPISTEMOLOGY 77 (2d ed. 2003) ("[T]o have an occurrent property is
to be doing, undergoing, or experiencing something, as sugar undergoes the process of
dissolving.").
53. See id. ("To have a dispositional property... is to be disposed ... to do or undergo
something under certain conditions, but not necessarily to be actually doing or undergoing or
experiencing something or changing in any way."); Michael Moore, Responsibility and the
Unconscious, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1563, 1621-22 (1980) ("[O]ne is conscious of going to lunch if
one can state what one is doing when one's attention is turned to the subject.").
54. See MICHAEL BILLIG, FREUDIAN REPRESSION 14-15 (1999) (explaining that popular
imagination hails Freud as the discoverer of the unconscious, where Freud insists on the distinction
between the unconscious and his theory of repression).
55. Allowing dispositional awareness to suffice for reckless-homicide liability is a matter of
some controversy. See, e.g., Shute, supra note 47, at 198 (noting "little agreement amongst
jurists ... as to whether knowledge or belief may be latent, or tacit, or must be explicit for criminal
liability to be established."). Some writers maintain or appear to maintain that reflective awareness,
and not merely dispositional awareness, is or should be required. See, e.g., DOUGLAS N. HUSAK,
PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 135-36 (1987) (claiming that dispositional awareness does not
suffice for recklessness); Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Opaque Recklessness, 91 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 597, 630, 642 (2001) (arguing that the Model Penal Code's reference to "conscious
disregard" in its definition of recklessness means reflective awareness is required); Simons, Bad
Character, supra note 46, at 254 n.76 (adopting the view that the Model Penal Code definition of
recklessness requires reflective awareness); Treiman, supra note 37, at 354 ("Having knowledge of
a risk involved in specific conduct, but not being aware of the risk at the moment, that is, not
stopping to think of the consequences, may be negligent but it is not reckless."); M. Wasik & M.P.
Thompson, "Turning a Blind Eye" as Constituting Mens Rea, 32 N. IRELAND LEGAL Q. 328, 342
(1981) (endorsing requirement of reflective awareness for recklessness).
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nonetheless chooses to take the risk because he seeks to satisfy a desire the
law declares unworthy of satisfaction given the risk the actor believes he
must take in order to satisfy it.56 At the time he chooses to take the risk, the
actor might hope the risk will not materialize, or he might be indifferent as to
whether or not it does. Either way, he is still guilty of (at least) reckless
homicide.57
Other writers maintain or appear to maintain, consistent with the position adopted here, that
dispositional awareness suffices or should suffice. See, e.g., R.A. DUFF, INTENTION, AGENCY &
CRIMINAL LIABILITY 160-61, 164-66 (1990) (arguing that "latent knowledge" [i.e., dispositional
awareness] suffices for recklessness, provided the reason the actor gave no thought to the matter
was due to indifference); VICTOR TADROS, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 257 (2005) ("If conscious
awareness [i.e., reflective awareness] ... is required. . . for the proper imposition of criminal
responsibility it is much too restrictive."); Alexander, Insufficient Concern, supra note 29, at 954
n.62 ("I am inclined to deem.., low-level consciousness of risk [i.e., dispositional awareness] to be
sufficient for recklessness culpability .... ); James B. Brady, Recklessness, 15 LAW & PHIL. 183,
187 (1996) (It "would be too restrictive an account of recklessness" to limit "conscious disregard"
to "those cases where a person has thought about a risk."); Eric Colvin, Recklessness and Criminal
Negligence, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 345, 362 (1982) ("[T]here should be no question that simple
consciousness of risk [i.e., dispositional awareness] falls within [the ambit of recklessness].");
Jeremy Horder, Gross Negligence and Criminal Culpability, 47 U. TORONTO L.J. 495, 510-11
(1997) (suggesting that "latent knowledge" [i.e., dispositional awareness] could suffice for criminal
liability); Moore, supra note 53, at 1621 ("A principle requiring that the actor think of [i.e., be
reflectively aware of] his actions, intentions, or reasons as he acts would be far too narrow.");
Simons, Culpability and Retributive Theory, supra note 46, at 385 ("Unless a cognitive test of
recklessness is somewhat expansive in its definition of.. . 'awareness,' it will have very few
applications."); cf Zimmerman, supra note 47, at 422 ("[I]n cases other than those of routine or
habitual actions, one incurs culpability for something only if one's cognitive connection to that
thing involves one's adverting to it." (emphasis added)).
56. The wrongfulness of any particular case of reckless homicide will be a function of (1) the
magnitude or size of the risk of causing death (ranging anywhere from nonzero to just short of
"practical certainty") that the actor believed he was taking or imposing; and (2) the content of the
desire that the actor sought to satisfy in taking that risk, which desire he endorses and executes in
acting. The greater the risk, the more wrongful the act (all else being equal); likewise, the more
reprehensible the desire, the more wrongful the act (all else being equal).
An especially wrongful case of reckless homicide would therefore be one in which the actor
believes that the probability of death is very high (though not practically certain) and the desire he
seeks to satisfy in taking that risk is one the law deems especially reprehensible. Indeed, an
otherwise reckless homicide of this sort would likely be graded as a form of murder, known as
"depraved heart" murder at common law, see JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
LAW § 31.05[A][1], at 512 (3d ed. 2001), "extreme indifference" murder under the MPC, see
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(l)(b) (1962), or "wicked recklessness" in Scots law. 2 SIR GERALD
H. GORDON, THE CRIMINAL LAW OF SCOTLAND § 23.19, at 297 (3d ed. 2001). Liability for murder
might also be warranted in cases where the desire the actor seeks to satisfy is especially
reprehensible even though the risk he believes he is imposing is very small. For example, playing a
one-off game of Russian roulette in which the risk of death is one-in-ten can still constitute murder
inasmuch as the actor's motive for imposing that risk is nothing more than the desire to experience
the thrill of endangering another's life. Cf Alexander, Insufficient Concern, supra note 29, at 934
("Imposing Russian roulette on others, no matter how high the ratio of empty to loaded chambers,
seems a clear case of criminally culpable conduct."); Simons, Bad Character, supra note 46, at 263
("[T]he Russian roulette player ... who willingly endangers another's life for the sake of a personal
thrill is extremely indifferent to the victim's fate.").
57. Some scholars argue that the wrongfulness of any particular case of reckless homicide
depends not only on the magnitude or size of the risk of causing death the actor believed he was
taking, nor only on the content of the desire the actor sought to satisfy in taking that risk, but also on
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With this analysis of reckless homicide in place, the difference between
an actor guilty of involuntary manslaughter and one guilty of reckless homi-
cide comes into focus. The reckless actor believes that p and is at least
dispositionally aware of his belief that p at the time he acts so as to create a
risk of causing death. The negligent actor's cognitive state differs in one of
three ways.
5 8
First, he might never even form the belief that p, nor even the suspicion
that p, despite the fact that his background beliefs are sufficient to support
the formation of that belief.5 9  Second, the actor might suspect that p, but
never form the belief that p, even though his background beliefs are once
again sufficient to support the formation of that belief. Third, the actor might
the "attitude" the actor possessed with respect to the harm risked at the time he acts. See, e.g.,
Michaels, supra note 48, at 962-63; Simons, Bad Character, supra note 46, at 267-68; Kenneth W.
Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REv. 463, 486-90 (1992) [hereinafter Simons, Mental
States].
According to this line of thought, an actor who takes a risk of causing death in order to satisfy a
particular desire might nonetheless hope that the risk does not materialize because, though he cares
too little for others to stop himself from taking the risk he needs to take in order to satisfy the desire
he seeks to satisfy, he cares enough to hope the risk does not materialize. Alternatively, he might be
indifferent, not caring one way or the other whether the risk materializes, because he does not care
enough about others to care what happens, in which case we might say the actor accepts the risk, or
is reconciled to it. For those who believe that an actor's deserved punishment depends in part on his
attitude toward the harm risked, an actor who possesses an attitude of indifference toward the risk,
who does not care one way or the other whether the risk materializes, deserves more punishment
than does one who hopes it does not.
Yet insofar as the "attitude" an actor possesses with respect to the harm risked at the time he
chooses to take that risk is ultimately reducible to desires he possesses or lacks when he acts, the
punishment he deserves cannot legitimately depend on any such attitude. The desires an actor
possesses or lacks at any particular point in time may show him to be a better or worse person, but
unless and until his will endorses and executes a desire in action, a state committed to the principle
that citizens should be punished for what they do, and not for who they are, cannot legitimately
enhance an actor's punishment based simply on desires he possessed or lacked at the time he chose
to take the risk. The desires an actor possesses or lacks at the time he acts may reveal the quality of
his character, but they do not reveal the quality of his will. Nonetheless, if an actor's good character
is a legitimate reason for extending mercy, and his bad character a legitimate reason for withholding
it, an actor who hopes the risk he is imposing does not materialize might be punished less than one
who is indifferent to it, not because the first actor deserves less punishment than the second, but
rather because he is a more appealing candidate for mercy.
58. The analysis here is limited to cases involving ignorance (i.e., cases in which an actor fails
to form the belief that p or forms that belief but remains unaware of it). It leaves aside any
complications that might arise when the case involves an actor who has made a mistake (i.e., cases
in which an actor mistakenly believes not-p).
59. See, e.g., Victor Tadros, Recklessness and the Duty to Take Care, in CRIMINAL LAW
THEORY, supra note 47, at 227, 257 ("If the defendant builds on [a] false belief to form the belief
that there was no risk in the activity performed in this case, for the most part at least, she ought not
to be regarded as [objectively] reckless [i.e., negligent]."); Low, supra note 19, at 549
("Negligence.. . involves a subjective inquiry (what the actor actually knew about the context) and
an objective inquiry (the inferences that should have drawn from what the actor knew)." (emphasis
added)). But see A.P. Simester, Can Negligence Be Culpable?, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE 85, 96 (Jeremy Horder ed., 2000) ("[T]he pool of information for evaluating action
is the union of that information which she should reasonably have possessed, and that which she did
in fact possess." (second emphasis added)).
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form the belief that p, but fail to become aware of that belief. As we will see,
actors possessing the second and third of these cognitive states, neither of
which suffices for reckless homicide liability, are nonetheless fair candidates
for involuntary manslaughter liability while actors in the first category are
not.
Although the cognitive states of the negligent actor and the reckless
actor differ in one of the ways just described, they are in one important
respect the same. The background beliefs available to both actors are suffi-
cient to support the formation of the belief that p at the moment each acts so
as to unleash a risk of causing death. Indeed, the reckless actor does form
that belief. But what if an actor's background beliefs are themselves not
what they should be? What if the actor possesses background beliefs he
should not, or does not possess background beliefs he should? What then?
We can sort the cases into two categories.
The first covers exculpatory cases. In these cases the actor fails to form
the belief that p, not because of any defect in the belief-formation process
itself, but rather because the actor possesses a background belief he should
not possess (mistake) or does not possess a background belief he should pos-
sess (ignorance). Consequently, the beliefs available to the actor are
insufficient to support the formation of the belief that p. In fact, they might
instead support the formation of the belief that not-p. In other words, given
the beliefs available to him at the time, the actor could not have formed the
belief that p. Thus, insofar as ought implies can, his ignorance with respect
to p at the moment he should have formed the belief that p is excusable
ignorance.
Accordingly, such an actor should not be held liable for involuntary
manslaughter, let alone reckless homicide. Involuntary manslaughter liabil-
ity should be limited to those actors whose available background beliefs do
support the formation of the belief that p but who culpably fail to form that
belief or who form that belief but culpably remain unaware of it. The
culpability, if any, of an actor for forming background beliefs he should not
have formed or failing to form background beliefs he should have formed-
the presence or absence of which in turn preclude the formation of the belief
that p-is a failing separate and distinct from his failure to form the belief
that p based on the background beliefs available to him at the time. The cul-
pability associated with any such prior failing should be assessed on its
merit.60 The same is true of background beliefs the actor forms but then
forgets. Once forgotten those beliefs are effectively unavailable to support
the formation of the belief that p.
60. An actor may be independently culpable for having done something to cause his
background ignorance or mistake, or for having failed to do something to remedy his background
ignorance or mistake, but he is not culpable for the causal effect of his ignorance or mistake on his
subsequent failure to form the belief that p. See infra notes 69-82 and accompanying text
(discussing the prior-choice theory).
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The second covers inculpatory cases. In these cases the actor does form
the belief that p. Yet he forms that belief, not because of any defect in the
belief-formation process itself, but rather because he possesses a background
belief he should not possess (mistake), or does not possess a background be-
lief he should possess (ignorance). Only now his mistake or ignorance is
inculpatory, not exculpatory. The actor believes that his act is creating a risk
of causing death, although he would not so have believed if he had possessed
the background beliefs he should have possessed or did not possess those he
should not have possessed. Nonetheless, he does believe that p.
Consequently, if he chooses to take the risk he believes exists in order to
satisfy a desire the law condemns, then he should be held liable for reckless
endangerment or attempted reckless homicide if death does not result, 61 or
for reckless homicide if it does.62
Cases in which criminal liability for involuntary manslaughter is
warranted fall into neither of these categories. Involuntary-manslaughter
liability is warranted only where the background beliefs available to the actor
support the formation of the conscious belief that p (unlike the exculpatory
case), but the actor fails to form that belief (unlike the inculpatory case). The
culpability of an actor who unwittingly creates an unjustified risk of causing
death consists not in the possession of background beliefs he should not have
possessed, nor in the failure to possess background beliefs he should have
possessed. It consists instead in his failure to form the conscious belief that p
when the background beliefs available to him support its formation, and
when he could and fairly should have formed it based on those background
beliefs.
61. See Robinson, supra note 39, at 387 (arguing that such an actor would be guilty of reckless
endangerment under the Model Penal Code). The Code defines "Recklessly Endangering Another
Person" as "recklessly [engaging] in conduct which places or may place another person in danger of
death or serious bodily injury." MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2 (1962). I should note that most
jurisdictions do not recognize attempted reckless homicide as a crime. See Michael T. Cahill,
Attempt, Reckless Homicide, and The Structure of Criminal Law, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming
2007) (manuscript at 3), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-894379 ("In nearly all jurisdictions to
consider the question, courts have held that no such offense [of attempted reckless homicide]
exists.").
62. See Robinson, supra note 39, at 387 (arguing that such an actor would be guilty of reckless
homicide (manslaughter) under the Model Penal Code); see also Alexander, Insufficient Concern,
supra note 29, at 936 (arguing that such an actor should be guilty of reckless homicide). The
longstanding and ongoing debate between those who argue that the extent of an actor's punishment
should reflect the harm he actually and proximately causes and those who argue that it should
reflect only the harm he intends to cause or consciously risks causing can safely be left to one side
for present purposes. Compare MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME 193 (1997) ("[C]ulpability is
both independently necessary and independently sufficient as a basis for some punishment, whereas
wrongdoing [or harm-causing] is neither. Yet wrongdoing is an independent desert basis... : when
culpability is present, wrongdoing independently influences how much punishment is deserved."),
with Stephen J. Morse, Reason, Results, and Criminal Responsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 428
(2004) (advocating an approach according to which "[t]here would be no difference in blame and
punishment between conduct that causes harm and similar conduct that does not"). My current
sympathies rest with the position Morse defends.
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II. Retribution and Involuntary Manslaughter
If an actor unleashes into the world a risk of causing another's death
(and death results), and if the background beliefs available to him at the time
support the formation of the belief that p, but the actor either fails to form
that belief or forms that belief but fails to become aware of it, should he be
punished? If so, why?
For those who embrace utilitarianism, he probably should be punished.
On this view the state is obligated to punish an actor when and because the
good consequences of punishing him outweigh the bad.63 If punishing the
unwitting actor happens to produce such a result, utilitarianism has no trou-
ble explaining why he should be punished. One might argue, for example,
that his punishment will create the incentive needed to encourage him and
others similarly situated to exercise due care in the future. That may be, but
utilitarianism cannot avoid the charge that it countenances the punishment of
the innocent and the disproportionate punishment of the guilty.64 It would
punish the unwitting actor even though he does not ex hypothesi deserve to
be punished, which is reason enough to set utilitarianism aside.
The natural alternative to utilitarianism is retribution. On this view the
state is obligated, all else being equal, to punish an actor because and to the
extent, but only to the extent, that he deserves to be punished.65 Retributive
theories differ from one another in (among other ways) what they take to be
the basis of one's just deserts. The orthodoxy draws a distinction between
character retribution and choice retribution.
Character retribution says that deserved punishment is ultimately based
on the odious character an actor reveals when he commits a crime without
justification or excuse. Insofar as an actor does indeed display such a char-
acter when he fails to realize that he is imposing on others an unjustified risk
of causing death-he is careless, thoughtless, indifferent, and so forth-
character retribution likewise has no trouble explaining why such an actor
63. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 62, at 91 ("[T]he ultimate justification for inflicting the harm
of punishment is that it is outweighed by the good to be achieved.").
64. See, e.g., id. at 94-97. So-called negative retributive theories according to which the
pursuit of utilitarian ends is subject to limits or side constraints barring the punishment of the
innocent and the disproportionate punishment of the guilty are an improvement on pure utilitarian
theories. They are nonetheless vulnerable to other objections. See id. at 97-102. For a recent effort
to defend the claim that one utilitarian goal (specific deterrence) should be the criminal law's
"predominant goal," see Christopher Slobogin, The Civilization of the Criminal Law, 58 VAND. L.
REV. 121 passim (2005).
65. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 62, at 104 ("Retributivism... is the view that it is a sufficient
reason for us to have punishment institutions (i.e., the criminal law) ... that the person deserve to
be punished."). It would be more precise to say that the statement in the text describes positive
retribution, according to which the state is obligated to impose retributive punishment, in contrast to
negative retribution, according to which the state is permitted though not obligated to impose
retributive punishment.
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should be punished.66 He deserves to be punished because he has shown
himself to be possessed of a character worthy of condemnation. That may
be, but character retribution is among other things inconsistent with the gen-
eral principle, to which any liberal state owes allegiance, that citizens can
legitimately be punished only for what they do, not for who they are.
67
That leaves choice retribution, according to which deserved punishment
is ultimately based on an actor's choice to do that which the law demands he
not do. But choice retribution and punishment for unwitting risk imposition
don't mix, since an actor who does not realize he is imposing a risk of caus-
ing harm cannot intelligibly be said to have chosen to take that risk.
Consequently, choice retribution would rule out punishment for involuntary
manslaughter altogether. Indeed, many scholars who can be understood as
proponents of choice retribution have reached precisely that conclusion.
68
66. Character retribution will of course have trouble explaining why an actor who unwittingly
imposes a lethal risk should be punished when the actor's failure to realize the risk was due to a
culpable but momentary lapse not sufficiently stable or enduring to be fairly characterized as a trait
of character at all. The fact that an actor may display indifference on a particular occasion does not
necessarily mean he is characteristically indifferent. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 62, at 590
("[Jiudgements of negligence do not depend on any general traits of carelessness; an isolated act
suffices for responsibility for the harm that act causes."); Simons, Culpability and Retributive
Theory, supra note 46, at 389 ("[I]ndifference can be illustrated even in a single 'out of character'
act.").
67. See MOORE, supra note 62, at 586 ("[N]o one deserves to be punished for being a poor
specimen of humanity. The aesthetic kind of responsibility that we admittedly do have for so much
of our characters as are unchosen cannot fairly lead to punishment, because we could not have
avoided possessing these aspects of ourselves."); Jeffrie G. Murphy, The State's Interest in
Retribution, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 283, 298 (1994) (concluding that robust versions of
retributivism, including character retributivism are probably not compatible with liberalism).
68. In contemporary American scholarship, this position is prominently associated with the
work of Larry Alexander. See Alexander, Reconsidering the Relationship, supra note 29, at 85
(concluding that the voluntary act principle requires us to reject principles that envision crimes
predicated on negligence); see also Larry Alexander, Crime and Culpability, 4 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 1, 7 (1994) [hereinafter Alexander, Crime and Culpability] ("[A]lthough some cases of
inadvertent negligence reflect prior culpable acts... inadvertent negligence is not itself culpable.");
Alexander, Insufficient Concern, supra note 29, at 952 ("Because the actor who fails to advert to a
risk acts in ignorance of that risk, he is not culpable for taking it.").
Earlier scholarship also defended this position. See J.W.C. Turner, The Mental Element in
Crimes at Common Law, 6 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 31, 39 (1936) ("It is... submitted with emphasis that
although.., negligence may be blameworthy and may ground civil liability, it is at the present day
not sufficient to amount to mens rea in crimes at common law."); see also Jerome Hall, Negligent
Behavior Should Be Excluded from Penal Liability, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 632, 632 (1963) ("[I]t
would be a great step forward to exclude negligent behavior from the scope of penal liability.").
H.L.A. Hart, in an influential reply to Turner, argued that Turner's arguments "rest on a mistaken
conception both of the way in which mental or 'subjective' elements are involved in human action,
and of the reasons why we attach the great importance which we do to the principle that liability to
criminal punishment should be conditional on the presence of a mental element." H.L.A. HART,
Negligence, Mens Rea, and Criminal Responsibility, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 136,
139 (1968). See Finkelstein, supra note 46, at 581, for a contemporary defense of Turner against
Hart, in which she argues that "[lliab[ility] in the absence of... subjective awareness on [an
actor's] part of what he was doing, under its prohibited description[,] ... is objectionable because it
is liability in the absence of ordinary responsibility." James Brady and A.P. Simester have replied
to Hall and Finkelstein. See James B. Brady, Punishment for Negligence: A Reply to Professor
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For them, any punishment of an actor who unwittingly creates a risk of
causing another's death is undeserved and hence unjust, because the actor did
not choose to take that risk.
One might nonetheless try to reconcile choice retribution with criminal
liability for unwitting risk-creation in either of two ways. The prior-choice
theory looks to the actual past. It asks: Did the actor make some prior culpa-
ble choice to impose on others an unjustified risk of causing death, or at least
some prior culpable choice but for which he would have realized he was im-
posing such a risk? If so, then punishment is warranted. The hypothetical-
choice theory looks to an imagined past. It asks: Would the actor have cho-
sen to take the risk if he had been aware of it, even though he was not in fact
aware of it? If so, then again, punishment is warranted. In the end, however,
neither theory accurately identifies when or why the state may legitimately
punish an actor who unwittingly creates a lethal risk.
A. The Prior-Choice Theory
The prior-choice theory presupposes that an actor who unwittingly
creates a lethal risk cannot fairly be subject to criminal liability for imposing
such a risk because, being unaware of the risk, he did not choose to impose
it. The theory likewise presupposes that the actor's failure to become aware
of the risk (i.e., to form the conscious belief that p) is not itself culpable, be-
cause at the time the actor should have formed the belief that p, he lacked the
capacity to form that belief, and lack of capacity is ordinarily an excuse.
Ought implies can, at least when the reaction to an actor's failure to do as he
ought is state punishment.
An actor can lack the capacity to form the belief that p at time tl for one
of three reasons. First, the actor can lack the capacity to form the belief that
p because the background beliefs available to him were insufficient to sup-
port the formation of the belief. Second, assuming that the background
beliefs internally available to the actor were sufficient to support the forma-
tion of the belief that p, the actor can nonetheless lack the capacity to form
the belief that p because he lacked the cognitive capacity needed for the be-
lief to form. He lacked the requisite intellectual wherewithal. Third,
assuming that the background beliefs available to the actor were sufficient to
support the formation of the belief that p, and that the actor possessed the
cognitive capacity needed to form that belief based on those background
beliefs, the actor can nonetheless lack the capacity to form the belief that p
because he lacked the conative capacity needed for the belief to form. He did
Hall, 22 BUFF. L. REV. 107, 121 (1972) (arguing that the "failure to exercise normal capacities to
avoid harm makes [a negligent actor's] conduct blameworthy," Hall's claims to the contrary
notwithstanding); A.P. Simester, Responsibility for Inadvertent Acts, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 601,
606 (2005) ("[N]ot all inadvertent acts are culpable-we acknowledge this, in legal usage, with the
familiar distinction between negligence and accident. One does not need to think of everything.
But on Finkelstein's account, we need think of nothing.").
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not care enough, either for the truth or for the well-being of others, needed
for him to have realized the risk he was creating.
Because the prior-choice theory assumes that the actor at time tl had a
valid excuse (based on lack of capacity) for not forming the belief that p, the
theory looks back in time for some prior culpable choice with respect to
which the actor had no excuse.69  From here the prior-choice theory splits
into two. The narrow version looks for a prior culpable choice on the actor's
part to violate the obligation not to act so as to create an unjustified risk of
causing death. The broad version looks for a prior culpable choice to violate
a range of other obligations, where that violation in turn causes the actor's
later incapacity to form the belief that p at time ti.
1. The Narrow Prior-Choice Theory.-According to the narrow prior-
choice theory, an actor who unwittingly creates an unjustified risk of causing
death (with death resulting) cannot fairly be punished if and because he
lacked the capacity at time tl to form the belief that he was creating a lethal
risk, and thus cannot be said to have chosen to take that risk. Nonetheless, he
can fairly be punished if he chose to impose a lethal risk at some earlier point
69. See, e.g., Alexander, Crime and Culpability, supra note 68, at 7 ("[A]lthough some cases of
inadvertent negligence reflect prior culpable acts..., inadvertent negligence is not itself
culpable."); Alexander, Insufficient Concern, supra note 29, at 950 ("Of course, inadvertence to risk
may reflect moral culpability in the sense that it is the product of a prior reckless act."); Alexander,
Reconsidering the Relationship, supra note 29, at 101-04 ("[T]here may be a sizeable subclass of
negligent acts where the failure of the defendant to advert to the risk was caused by some prior
culpable-and hence fully voluntary--choice of the defendant."). Statements of the prior-choice
theory also appear in the philosophical literature on moral responsibility. See Ishtiyaque Haji, An
Epistemic Dimension of Blameworthiness, 57 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 523, 541-42
(1997) (arguing that an actor who does not believe an act is wrong is not blameworthy for
performing that action, though he may be blameworthy for performing earlier actions he does
believe are wrong and that result in his not believing the later action is wrong); Gideon Rosen,
Culpability and Ignorance, 103 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN Soc'Y 61, 63 (2002) ("If I recklessly shirk
[an epistemic] obligation and wind up ignorant as a result, the ignorance itself is culpable, and in
that case it's no excuse." (emphasis omitted)); Holly Smith, Culpable Ignorance, 92 PHIL. REV.
543, 570 (1983) ("In cases of culpable ignorance, the [later] unwitting act is a risked upshot of the
[prior] benighting act."); Zimmerman, supra note 47, at 417 ("[C]ulpability for ignorant behavior
must be rooted in culpability that involves no ignorance."). See James A. Montmarquet, Culpable
Ignorance and Excuses, 80 PHIL. STUD. 41 (1995) [hereinafter Montmarquet, Culpable Ignorance]
and James Montmarquet, Zimmerman on Culpable Ignorance, 109 ETHICS 842 (1999), for critiques
of Smith and Zimmerman, respectively. For Zimmerman's response to Montmarquet, see Michael
J. Zimmerman, Controlling Ignorance: A Bitter Truth, 33 J. SOC. PHIL. 483, 485 (2002).
Steven Sverdlik argues that an actor's failure to advert to a risk can be culpable even if it cannot
be traced back in time to any prior culpable choice, or in other words, even if the actor's failure to
advert to the risk is "pure." See Steven Sverdlik, Pure Negligence, 30 AM. PHIL. Q. 137, 141
(1993). According to Sverdlik, cases of pure negligence are culpable insofar as the actor could have
engaged in the "moral reflection" needed for him to have become aware of the risk he was creating.
See id. at 142. Although I agree with Sverdlik's claim that an actor's failure to advert to a risk can
be culpable even if his ignorance cannot be traced back in time to any prior culpable choice, I
disagree with his claim that an actor's failure to exercise his capacity for "moral reflection" is
sufficient to render his ignorance culpable. See infra notes 100-12 and accompanying text
(describing conditions under which an actor's failure to form the conscious belief thatp is culpable).
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in time (tl-,). If he chose to act at time tl-, with the purpose of causing death,
or believing that death either would or might result, then assuming his act is
neither justified nor excused, he can fairly be held liable for murder or reck-
less homicide if death results, or for attempted murder or attempted reckless
homicide if it does not.
In other words, when viewed up close, some cases of murder or reckless
homicide might mistakenly look like cases in which the actor's risk imposi-
tion should be excused for lack of capacity. The true picture emerges only
when we pull back and open the time frame. When we do so we see that
sometimes the actor has made a prior culpable choice rendering him liable
for murder or reckless homicide, and not simply involuntary manslaughter.
For example, if the Williamses had realized at time ti-, that inaction would
risk their son's life, they would have been guilty of reckless homicide
(assuming their inaction was unjustified), even if somehow they later came to
lack the belief that his life was in danger, or even came to believe that his life
was in no danger.7 ° Of course, if the actor has made no such prior culpable
choice, and remained unaware of the risk he was creating or allowing to
persist, then no liability would be warranted.
The narrow prior-choice theory is unobjectionable, at least insofar as the
liability it would impose on an actor matches the culpability associated with
his prior choices. The problem is that it fails to explain when and why an
actor's failure to realize he is creating a risk of causing death is culpable
when his ignorance cannot be traced back to any prior culpable choice. It
wrongly assumes that an actor's prima facie lack of capacity to form the be-
lief that p at time t, necessarily excuses his failure to form that belief, thus
triggering the need to look back in time for some prior culpable choice to
impose a lethal risk. It ignores the possibility that an actor may sometimes
be able through the exercise of doxastic self-control to remove the impedi-
ments causing him otherwise to lack the capacity to form the conscious belief
that p, such that his culpability for failing to form that belief consists in his
failure to exercise such self-control, and not in any prior choice. The basic
idea is that the actor can and sometimes should intervene into his own self-
constitution, that doing so will enable him to see the risk he is creating, and
that his failure to so intervene is culpable.
70. The case usually cited as an example of the narrow prior-choice theory is People v. Decina,
138 N.E.2d 799 (N.Y. 1956), in which Decina, an epileptic, suffered a seizure while driving his car.
Id. at 800. The car went out of control and four children were killed. Id. at 801. Decina claimed
that he had a valid defense to the crime charged and moved to dismiss the indictment: while in the
midst of the seizure he lacked the capacity to control his car and so could not have avoided creating
the lethal risk. Id. at 803. The Court of Appeals upheld the order of the Appellate Division
upholding in turn the trial court's refusal to dismiss the indictment. Id. at 804. Decina knew he
suffered from epilepsy, knew he might at any moment have a seizure, and nonetheless chose to get
into his car and drive. Id. at 803-04. Although he did not choose to let his car go out of control at
time ti, he nonetheless chose to create a lethal risk at time t1 _,, when he chose to drive, and that
choice ultimately caused the children's deaths.
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2. The Broad Prior-Choice Theory.-The broad prior-choice theory
focuses, not on an actor's prior choice to violate the obligation against
creating an unjustified risk of causing death, but on some other obligation the
breach of which is the but-for and proximate cause of the actor's later inca-
pacity at time ti to form the belief that p. 7 1 Although lack of capacity would
ordinarily be an excuse, the broad prior-choice theory holds that an actor for-
feits to some extent or another any such excuse if and because his incapacity
at time t, is the result of a prior culpable choice.7
A complete account of the broad prior-choice theory would need to
address two issues. First, it would need to say what other obligations we
have, the culpable breach of which will result in forfeiture of an otherwise
valid incapacity excuse. These obligations might be specified ex ante in the
text of a criminal code, or a judge or jury might determine them ex post in
the course of a criminal prosecution.73 The content of these obligations
might range anywhere from an obligation to gather evidence and
information, so as to have available at time tl all the evidence one ought to
have at that time, to an obligation to develop in oneself those capacities, both
cognitive and conative, that one ought to possess and that one would need to
possess in order to form the belief that p based on the evidence available at
time t1.74  The relevant obligation might also be an obligation to think or
7 1. Again, an actor might lack the capacity to form the belief that p either because he then and
there lacks the background beliefs sufficient to support the formation of that belief or because he
lacks the cognitive or conative capacities necessary for its formation. See supra subpart II(A).
72. For the classic discussion of this general problem, see Paul H. Robinson, Causing the
Conditions of One's Own Defense: A Study in the Limits of Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine, 71
VA. L. REV. 1 (1985).
73. See, e.g., Alexander, Reconsidering the Relationship, supra note 29, at 102-03 (describing
these two approaches). Allowing the existence and content of an obligation to be determined ex
post naturally raises legitimate concerns about holding an actor criminally liable for breaching an
obligation about which he might reasonably have been unaware at the time he acted or failed to act.
Such concerns are especially acute when the obligation breached is an obligation to act, such that
the breach arises from an omission. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Criminal Liability for Omissions:
An Inventory of Issues, in CRIMINAL LAW THEORY, supra note 47, at 121, 124 ("Because the duty
to rescue exists only when the rescue is 'safe' or 'easy'-and because its existence also depends on
some very vague notions of status relationships and reliance-the scope of the duty is arguably so
vague as to threaten its legality.").
74. Aristotle is often read to have embraced a position along these lines. See 2 ARISTOTLE,
Nicomachean Ethics, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 111.5.1113b-11 14a, at 1729, 1758
(Bollingen Series No. 71, Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984) (Revised Oxford Translation). This position
can also be found in the work of contemporary writers. See, e.g., Jean Hampton, Mens Rea, SOC.
PHIL. & POL'Y, Spring 1990, at 1, 27 ("If we take an Aristotelian attitude towards [an] inadvertently
negligent person, we believe that, although she did not know that what she was doing was wrong,
that ignorance was a function of her faulty character .... So we locate the defiance not at the time
of the act, but earlier, during the process of character-formation."); Hilary Kornblith, Justified Belief
and Epistemically Responsible Action, 92 PHIL. REv. 33, 38 (1983) ("[Tlhere can be no doubt that
one can self-consciously instill in oneself a certain circumspection in circumstances where [an
epistemic] mistake is likely to occur .... ); Simester, supra note 59, at 98 ("Our duty to take
care ... obligates us also to acquire the capacity to do so; in effect, we may be expected to ascertain
our faults and to remedy or at least compensate for them."); Tadros, supra note 59, at 246 ("That we
have some control over whether we have the vice of clumsiness makes [an act attributable to that
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reason or deliberate, at least insofar as thinking, reasoning, or deliberating
can be characterized as actions, on the theory that that actor would have
formed the belief thatp if he had so thought, reasoned, or deliberated.75
For example, perhaps the Williamses should have taken a parenting
class on children's medical emergencies, where they would have been ex-
posed to information enabling them to identify life-threatening risks.7 6  If
their failure to take the class and thereby gain the relevant information was a
but-for and proximate cause of their later incapacity to realize the danger to
their son's life, then they would forfeit the opportunity to claim this lack of
capacity as an excuse to their subsequent failure to form the belief that p.
Second, assuming some prior culpable choice can be identified, the
theory would need to say what effect, if any, that choice will have on the
actor's opportunity to claim the incapacity excuse to which he would other-
wise be entitled. One option would be to say that the actor's prior culpable
choice should result in a partial forfeiture of his opportunity to claim lack of
capacity as an excuse, such that his lack of capacity affords him only a partial
excuse.77  In this case the actor would presumably be held liable, not for
reckless homicide, but for the lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter.
Another option would be to say that the actor's prior culpable choice should
result in the complete forfeiture of this opportunity to claim lack of capacity
as an excuse, such that his lack of capacity affords him no excuse. In this
case he would presumably be held liable for reckless homicide.78
vice] reflect our agency sufficiently to attribute us with responsibility for doing so."). See Kyron
Huigens, Virtue and Criminal Negligence, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 431, 444 (1998), for an
alternative reading of the relevant passages of Aristotle's Ethics, according to which "actions done
in ignorance... are ... not subject to blame, only if.. . the agent [subsequently] feel[s] regret for
having committed them."
75. See, e.g., AUDI, supra note 52, at 160 ("Reasons, one might say, can lead to inferential
beliefs by two different paths, one requiring reasoning, the other not .... In the first case, I do
something .... In the second, something happens in me. ); JOSEPH RAz, ENGAGING REASON
13 (1999) ("We can choose to perform or not to perform mental acts, in which action has to do with
thinking .... [But] while we can choose when to think and of what, it does not follow that we can
choose the results of our thinking."). Holly Smith seems to believe that an actor's drawing of an
incorrect inference, or presumably his failure to draw a correct inference, can also qualify as a
culpable act or omission. See Smith, supra note 69, at 547 (arguing that a prior culpable act, which
she refers to as a "benighting act" can be a "mental occurrence (such as making an incorrect
inference), and the temporal gap between it and the unwitting act is infinitesimal"). I am presently
inclined to think that inference-drawing or failing to draw an inference cannot be fairly
characterized as an act or omission insofar as neither is subject to the will. Thinking, deliberating,
and so forth are mental acts subject to the will, but belief-formation itself is not. Thus, whether one
characterizes inference-drawing as an act or not may depend on whether one uses the phrase
"inference-drawing" to mean thinking or deliberating, or whether one uses the phrase to refer to
belief-formation itself
76. Alexander, Reconsidering the Relationship, supra note 29, at 101-02.
77. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 69, at 549 (describing this view as the "Moderate View").
78. See, e.g., id. at 548 (characterizing this view as the "Conservative View"). An actor would
remain free to claim incapacity as an excuse if (1) he has made no prior culpable choice upon which
a forfeiture can be grounded; or (2) he has made a prior culpable choice but that choice is given no
effect with regard to the actor's opportunity to assert the incapacity excuse to which he is otherwise
20061
HeinOnline -- 85 Tex. L. Rev. 355 2006-2007
Texas Law Review
The Model Penal Code rule governing voluntary intoxication provides
one example of the broad prior-choice theory in practice. 79 The voluntarily-
intoxicated actor chooses to become or risk becoming intoxicated. 0 If he
later acts so as unwittingly to create an unjustified risk of causing death (and
death results), he would, but for the operation of the Code's forfeiture rule,
have a defense to a charge of reckless homicide. He lacked the awareness of
the risk required to describe him as reckless. But the Model Penal Code
treats his prior choice to risk intoxication as the basis upon which he forfeits
that defense inasmuch as his failure to be aware of the risk is, if due to his
intoxication, "immaterial.",8' Even if he lacked the capacity to form the con-
scious belief that p at the time he created the risk, he forfeits the opportunity
to substantiate that defense based on his prior choice to risk intoxication.
Unlike the narrow prior-choice theory, the broad prior-choice theory is
objectionable. The problem lies in the forfeiture rules on which the theory is
based. Such rules result in an actor's being punished even though he could
not have realized at time t1 that he was creating a risk of causing death and a
fortiori never chose to impose any such risk. An actor who falls within the
scope of a forfeiture rule is therefore one who would otherwise have a valid
defense to liability. He is nonetheless partially or completely divested of that
defense due to some prior culpable choice. Consequently, assuming the cul-
pability associated with the actor's prior choice is less than the culpability
associated with the crime of which he is convicted, punishing him for that
crime would amount to disproportionate and thus unjust punishment, though
how disproportionate and unjust will depend on the culpability of the prior
choice. 82 A parent should not go to prison for involuntary manslaughter be-
cause he or she decided to skip class one day.
entitled, although the actor remains liable for his prior culpable choice itself. See, e.g., id. at 549
(describing (2) as the "Liberal View").
79. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 (1962). The exact rules governing the effect of voluntary
intoxication on an actor's criminal liability vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. See, e.g., Mitchell
Keiter, Just Say No Excuse: The Rise and Fall of the Intoxication Defense, 87 J. GRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 482, 518-20 (1997) (categorizing various state-law rules governing the admissibility
of evidence of voluntary intoxication in criminal prosecutions).
80. The Code actually treats an actor as suffering from "self-induced intoxication" when he
"knowingly introduces [substances] into his body, the tendency of which to cause intoxication
he... ought to know." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(5)(b) (1962) (emphasis added). The Code
therefore treats negligence with respect to the intoxicating nature of a knowingly-introduced
substance as a sufficient basis for the operation of the forfeiture stated in § 2.08(2). Recklessness
with respect to the intoxicating nature of the substance would also suffice. See id. § 2.02(5).
81. See id. § 2.08(2).
82. See Robinson, supra note 72, at 29 ("To punish an actor for conduct performed when he is
not responsible is to punish him for conduct that society has determined to be ... blameless.").
Involuntary-manslaughter liability might also be portrayed as resting on a so-called substitution
rule, according to which one mental state or set of mental states is allowed to substitute for another.
As Michael Moore explains it:
On this view negligence is just a substitution rule for belief states: when an actor
believes that he is shooting at a target, believes he hears a shout of 'don't shoot',
believes only humans make such sounds and usually only when in danger, yet does not
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In any event, like the narrow prior-choice theory, the broad prior-choice
theory cannot explain when and why an actor's failure to realize he is creat-
ing a risk of causing death is culpable when his ignorance cannot be traced
back to any prior culpable choice. It wrongly assumes, as does the narrow
prior-choice theory, that an actor's prima facie lack of capacity to form the
belief that p at time t1 necessarily precludes any culpability for the actor's
failure to form that belief. The broad prior-choice theory must therefore im-
pute culpability for the actor's lethal risk-creation where no such culpability
exists. It ignores, as does the narrow prior-choice theory, the possibility that
an actor may sometimes be able through the exercise of doxastic self-control
to remove the impediments causing him to lack the capacity to form the con-
scious belief that p, such that his culpability for failing to form that belief
consists in his failure to exercise such self-control, and not in any prior
choice for which he is then held to forfeit the opportunity to plead or prove
lack of capacity as a defense.
Can the prior-choice theory explain why one might think retributive
punishment is warranted for Sam and Tiffany but not for the Williamses? It
depends. If Sam and Tiffany are guilty of a prior culpable choice that in turn
caused them to be unaware of the risk to their child's life, but the Williamses
are not guilty of any such prior choice, then the theory can explain the
difference. But insofar as the difference between the two cases is thought not
to depend on any such contingency, then the explanation the prior-choice
theory offers for the difference is the wrong explanation.
B. The Hypothetical-Choice Theory
Another way in which one might try to reconcile choice retribution with
criminal liability for unwitting risk creation ultimately turns not on actual
prior choice, but on imagined hypothetical choice. 83 The hypothetical-choice
believe that his shooting risks becoming a killing, he is culpable for believing (to the
probability of reasonable inference) that he is killing.
MOORE, supra note 62, at 413. In other words, an actor whose background beliefs support the
formation of the belief that p will be treated as if he believed that p, even though he did not in fact
believe that p. The background beliefs he has substitute for the belief that p, which he should have
had but did not. The problem with such a rule, as with the forfeiture rules discussed in the text, is
that it results in punishment disproportionate to culpability because the actor is treated as if he
possessed a culpable mental state when he in fact did not. See id. at 413 ("One who intends to
inflict grievous bodily harm has a level of culpability commensurate to that wrong, not a level of
culpability commensurate to the wrong actually done but not intended."); see also Ferzan, supra
note 55, at 603-06 (arguing that substituting one mental state for another "demonstrates a
willingness to punish people disproportionate to their culpability").
83. The description of the hypothetical-choice theory offered in the text is based on arguments
contained in the writings of a number of scholars. For reasons that will become apparent this theory
might also be called the "indifference theory." See, e.g., MAYO MORAN, RETHINKING THE
REASONABLE PERSON 257 (2003) (describing this theory as the "indifference account").
The hypothetical-choice theory arguably once had and arguably continues to have some support
in English law. In Regina v. Caldwell, [1982] A.C. 341 (H.L. 1981) (appeal taken from Eng.), the
House of Lords held that an actor could be said to be reckless as to some harm if "(1) he does an act
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theory posits that some but not all cases in which an actor unwittingly creates
an unjustified risk of causing death warrant retributive punishment. What
distinguishes those cases in which punishment is warranted from those in
which it is not is why the actor failed to form the belief that p.84 When the
beliefs available to an actor support the formation of the belief that p, an
actor's failure to form that belief can have one of two explanations.
First, the actor may lack the cognitive capacity needed to form the belief
that p. 5 Whether an actor lacks the necessary cognitive wherewithal to form
the belief that p will sometimes be hard to say, but if he does, then he could
not form the belief that p, which explains why he did not form it. Second,
the actor may lack the conative capacity needed to form the belief that p.
The idea here is that some standing desire to treat and regard others as moral
agents worthy of concern and respect is needed in order for an actor to real-
ize that he is creating a risk of causing harm to others. An actor suffers from
a conative incapacity to form the belief that p if, at the moment he should
have formed that belief, his conative makeup prevents its formation, even
though his background beliefs support its formation and even though he pos-
sesses the cognitive capacity to form it.
The hypothetical-choice theory is based on the second explanation. It
presupposes that an actor who fails to realize he is creating a lethal risk pos-
sesses the cognitive capacity to form the belief that p, but nonetheless lacks
86
the requisite conative capacity. He fails to realize he is creating a lethal
risk because, one might say, he is indifferent to the well-being of others, or
which in fact creates an obvious risk [of causing that harm] and (2) when he does the act he either
has not given any thought to the possibility of there being any such risk or has recognised that there
was some risk involved and has none the less gone on to do it." Id. at 354 (opinion of Lord
Diplock) (emphasis added). Caldwell provoked considerable controversy among English
commentators. See Simons, Mental States, supra note 57, at 487-88 n.87 (collecting literature).
Although Caldwell now only applies to a very few statutory offenses in England, see ASHWORTH,
supra note 38, § 5.3(c), at 187 ("The Caldwell definition is now of little practical significance."),
A.P. SIMESTER & G.R. SULLIVAN, CRIMINAL LAW § 5.2(i), at 143 (2d ed. 2003) (noting that in
England the Caldwell decision is applicable to few offenses other than the offense in Caldwell itself
and that Caldwell no longer applies to the offenses of manslaughter, assault, or rape), the arguments
of hypothetical-choice theorists, especially English theorists, can be understood as efforts to
vindicate Caldwell's basic proposition that some cases of unwitting risk imposition warrant
retributive punishment. See, e.g., DUFF, supra note 55, at 165 ("The truth in Caldwell... is that the
indifference which constitutes recklessness can sometimes be shown in an agent's very failure to
notice a risk which her action creates, as well as in her conscious risk-taking.").
84. DUFF, supra note 55, at 165-66 ("[W]hat matters is not just that, but why, the agent fails to
notice an obvious risk; she is reckless [culpably negligent] only if she fails to notice it because she
does not care about it.").
85. See, e.g., Simester, supra note 59, at 102-03 (distinguishing low intelligence from
inattention to demonstrate the difference in underlying beliefs between the mistake understandably
made by an actor of low intelligence and a mistake carelessly made by an inattentive actor of higher
intelligence).
86. See, e.g., DUFF, supra note 55, at 154 (describing "indifference" in terms of "attitudes" or
"feelings"); Horder, supra note 55, at 501 (describing "indifference" as an "affective state");
Simons, Culpability and Retributive Theory, supra note 46, at 388 (describing "indifference" as a
"desire-state").
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lacks sufficient concern for their well-being, or does not care enough about
their well-being.87 The conative constitution of such an actor can be config-
ured in two different ways, either of which results in his lacking sufficient
concern for the well-being of others at time t, and thus in his lacking the
conative capacity to form the belief thatp.
First, an indifferent actor's conative incapacity may result from a
constitutive lack of sufficient concern for the interests and well-being of
others, and at the extreme, a complete lack of such concern. 88 In the latter
case, the indifferent actor begins to look either like a psychopath, who cares
for himself but has zero concern for others,89 or like someone suffering from
87. See, e.g., DUFF, supra note 55, at 157 (culpable negligence is "essentially a matter... of a
kind of 'practical indifference."'); MORAN, supra note 83, at 258 ("[T]he indifference account
places its focus on the attitude displayed by any particular action."); SAMUEL H. PILLSBURY,
JUDGING EVIL 171 (1998) ("Where the accused did not perceive the risks involved at the time of his
conduct, culpability rests on a judgment about why the person failed to perceive."); Tadros, supra
note 59, at 229 (arguing that liability for negligence is not warranted unless the "defendant's action
is a manifestation of one of a narrow range of vices: primarily, vices that show that the defendant
has insufficient regard for the interests of others"); Horder, supra note 55, at 501 ("The subjective
element in indifference lies ... in an uncaring attitude towards the victim's relevant protected
interests."); Samuel H. Pillsbury, Crimes of Indifference, 49 RUTGERS L.J. 105, 151 (1996) ("The
key to culpability for failure to perceive is why the person failed to perceive."); Simons, Culpability
and Retributive Theory, supra note 46, at 388 ("Culpable indifference ... is a desire-state reflecting
the actor's grossly insufficient concern for the interests of others."); Simons, Bad Character, supra
note 46, at 264 ("[One] possible culpable indifference standard... asks what the actor would have
done if he had had a different belief about the relevant risks."); Simons, Mental States, supra note
57, at 487 ("[R]eckless indifference... [means] caring much less about the result than the actor
should."); cf Montmarquet, Culpable Ignorance, supra note 69, at 43 (arguing that an actor is
culpable for possessing a belief if and when that belief has been "formed with (or characterized by)
an intellectually irresponsible attitude (i.e., an attitude, broadly put, of insufficient regard for truth
and evidence)"); George Sher, Out of Control, 116 ETHICS 285, 298 (2006) ("[O]ne obvious way to
articulate a conception of control that can be instanced even by agents who do not know that they
are acting wrongly is to say that someone exercises such control whenever his not believing that he
is acting wrongly is explained not by his lack of access to the facts that make his act wrong but
rather by some subset of the other beliefs (desires, attitudes, etc.) that make him the person he is.").
88. See, e.g., DUFF, supra note 55, at 155 (seeming to equate "feel[ing] indifferent to ... the
safety" of others with "feel[ing] no concern for their safety" (emphasis added)); Horder, supra note
55, at 503 ("The strongly indifferent person.., is moved only by his own agent-relative values (and
prudential reasons relating thereto)." (emphasis added)).
89. See, e.g., RONALD D. MILO, IMMORALITY 61 (1984) ("Perhaps the most distinguishing
characteristic of the psychopath is that he is entirely egocentric, without any concern whatsoever for
the needs and interests of others."). Writers disagree on whether a psychopath's complete lack of
concern for others renders him incapable of knowing or appreciating the difference between right
and wrong, or simply incapable of being motivated to act in accordance with his judgments of right
and wrong, and on whether the psychopath's condition, however characterized, defeats (in whole or
in part) the responsibility he would otherwise bear for his actions. See, e.g., JEFFRIE G. MURPHY,
Moral Death: A Kantian Essay on Psychopathy, in RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 128, 130
(1979) ("[P]sychopaths know, in some sense, what it means to wrong people, to act immorally,
[but] this kind of judgement has for them no motivational component at all."); Walter Glannon,
Psychopath)' and Responsibility, 14 J. APPLIED PHIL. 263, 273 (1997) ("[P]sychopaths are deficient
in the deep moral knowledge of right and wrong required to be completely responsible for their
behaviour, [but] they nonetheless have sufficient moral understanding to be partly responsible for
their actions."); Ishtiyaque Haji, The Emotional Depravity of Psychopaths and Culpability, 9 LEGAL
THEORY 63, 82 (2003) (arguing that the culpability of a psychopath whose "emotional impairment"
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profound depression, who has zero concern, not only for others, but for him-
self as well. 90 Such an actor lacks sufficient desire, or perhaps any desire, to
regard others with the concern to which their status as a moral agent entitles
them to be treated and thus lacks the conative capacity needed to form the
belief that p. Moreover, inasmuch as desires cannot directly be willed into
existence or willed to be stronger, the indifferent actor so portrayed can do
nothing then and there to repair the unfortunate state of his conative
constitution.
Second, an indifferent actor's conative incapacity may result from a
non-constitutive lack of sufficient concern for the interests and well-being of
others. Such an actor is not constitutionally indifferent. On the contrary, he
ordinarily regards other people as moral agents worthy of respect and is mo-
tivated accordingly. The problem is that his own concerns or interests
eclipse, outweigh, or trump his concern for others, such that the net effect is
to place him in a conative state in which his concern for others is insufficient
to support the formation of the belief that p.91 An actor might routinely or
habitually find himself in such a state, in which case we might say that he is
an indifferent person; or he might only occasionally find himself in such a
state, in which case we might say simply that he has an indifferent attitude on
those occasions.92 Either way, at the point in time at which the actor should
makes an act "difficult to perform," but whose action otherwise satisfies the conditions of
responsibility, is not "subvert[ed]" but may be "attenuat[ed]"); Ishtiyaque Haji, On Psychopaths and
Culpability, 17 LAW & PHIL. 117, 139-40 (1998) ("[Iln a wide range of cases, the problem of
attributing responsibility to the psychopath turns essentially on epistemic requirements of
responsibility[,]... [such that] in a host of primary cases, the psychopath is not to blame for her
offenses.").
90. The Latin term for the condition I have in mind here is accidie. The term "listlessness" also
captures the phenomenon. See Alfred R. Mele, Internalist Moral Cognitivism and Listlessness, 106
ETHICS 727, 734 (1996) ("In its most severe forms,... listlessness [or accidie] consists in the total
absence of motivation to engage in activities of kinds that formerly were matters of deep personal
concern. The phenomenon has been linked... to clinical depression."). Christian theologians used
the term "sloth" to describe this condition, although that term has come to be associated with
laziness. Compare 3 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Pt. II-II, Q. 35, Art. 1, at 1339
(Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Christian Classics 1981) (1948) (defining sloth
as "an oppressive sorrow, which.., so weighs upon man's mind, that he wants to do nothing"),
with WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED 2146 (1986) (listing
laziness as a representative synonym).
91. See, e.g., Horder, supra note 55, at 502 ("[F]or the weakly indifferent person the existence
(and strength) of agent-neutral reasons may be obscured by his or her attachment to the pursuit of
agent-relative values in a particular set of circumstances.").
92. See, e.g., id at 505-06 (emphasizing the distinction between "someone [who] is indifferent
by nature (a claim about that person's character) ... [and someone whose] particular action
manifests indifference (a claim about that person's conduct)"); Smith, supra note 69, at 555-56
(distinguishing between character traits and "undesirable configuration[s] of desires and aversions
that generates the choice to perform that action"); Sverdlik, supra note 69, at 144 ("[P]ure
negligence often gets explained by the way that various morally significant psychological states
affect a person's thought[s]. I am inclined to include in these states both character traits and
attitudes.").
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have formed the belief that p, his insufficient concern for others prevented
him from forming it.
So understood, the hypothetical-choice theory maintains that an
indifferent actor can fairly be punished, not because he chose to do anything
the law prohibits, but simply for being in or possessing a particular conative
state, where that state then prevented him from forming the belief that p. The
objection to any such theory is straightforward. If an indifferent actor could
not have formed the belief that p because he lacked sufficient concern for
others, then however much we might censure him for being so constituted, he
has not yet chosen to do anything for which he can fairly be punished. He
did of course fail to form the belief that p, and as a result, he unwittingly cre-
ated a lethal risk. Yet he did not choose not to form that belief. On the
contrary, he failed to form that belief because he lacked the capacity to form
it, and incapacity ordinarily excuses.
93
Here is the point at which the idea of hypothetical choice figures into
the theory. Faced with this objection, that an indifferent actor who fails to
form the belief that p has not chosen to do anything for which he can fairly
be punished, the hypothetical-choice theorist turns, not to prior choice, but to
hypothetical or counterfactual choice.94 Although an indifferent actor has not
in fact chosen to impose a lethal risk, he can nonetheless fairly be punished,
so the argument goes, if he would have chosen to impose such a risk had he
been aware of it. Thus if an actor who unwittingly creates a lethal risk would
have taken that risk had he been aware of it, then he can on this theory fairly
be subject to retributive punishment. Indeed, he can fairly be subject to pun-
ishment not only for involuntary manslaughter but perhaps 'or reckless
homicide.95
93. If the hypothetical-choice theorist were at this point to insist that the actor is nonetheless
responsible for his ignorance if and because he culpably chose to cause the motivational incapacity
giving rise to it, then the hypothetical-choice theory would collapse into the broad prior-choice
theory. See supra notes 71-82 and accompanying text.
94. Alan Michaels endorses the use of hypothetical choice only when an actor chooses to act
despite believing his act would create a less-than-certain risk of causing a statutorily-proscribed
harm and the hypothetical inquiry is whether the actor would have chosen to act even if he believed
his act would be practically certain to cause the statutorily-proscribed harm. Michaels, supra note
48, at 961-62. He refuses to endorse the use of hypothetical choice when an actor does not choose
to take such a risk because he is unaware of any such risk and the hypothetical inquiry is whether
the actor would have chosen to take the risk if he had been aware of it. Id. at 962 n.26. Michaels
declines to extend the hypothetical-choice theory in this way in part because he believes that doing
so would make the actor's indifference a "mere unconnected thought," as opposed to an "actual
culpable mental state linked to an act." Id. In my view, this reservation applies with equal force to
the circumstances in which Michaels endorses the use of hypothetical choice. A hypothetical
choice is not an actual choice no matter how you cut it. According to Michaels, "[i]f the actor is
willing to endure the result or the circumstance that is a necessary adjunct to his conduct, then he
'accepts' the result or circumstance." Id. at 962 (emphasis added). But unless the actor believes the
result will occur or that the circumstance exists, he has not yet shown himself "willing to endure"
that circumstance or result. He might be willing, but then again, he might not.
95. Horder describes an actor who, had he cared enough, would have realized the risk and not
taken it as "weakly indifferent," and an actor who, had he cared enough, would have realized the
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This resort to hypothetical choice is ultimately unpersuasive. In some
cases we can of course be quite confident about what an actor who was un-
aware of a risk would have done if he had been aware of it. Perhaps, as has
been suggested, the hypothetical-choice theory should be limited to those
cases in which the available evidence about what an actor would have done is
truly compelling.96 For example, suppose the actor experiences no genuine
regret nor honest remorse when he realizes that his unwitting risk imposition
has caused someone's death. Or suppose he actually confesses after the fact
that he would have done the same thing even if he had been aware of the risk
beforehand. Who would feel sorry punishing such an actor? Aren't we
pretty sure that he would have done the same thing even if he had been aware
of the risk? Why not punish him?
Such cases test our commitment to the principle that punishment should
be imposed only for what we choose to do, and not on predictions, however
firm, about what we probably would have chosen to do if we possessed be-
liefs we actually lacked.97 If we opt to impose punishment in such cases, we
should be honest with ourselves about what the actor is being punished for.
He is being punished for lacking sufficient concern for others, which lack of
concern in turn prevented him from realizing the risk he was creating, and on
the basis of which we predict he would have taken the risk even if he had
been aware of it. In other words, he is being punished for having desires he
should not have had, or for lacking desires he should not have lacked, and as
such, he is being punished for who he is, or at least for who he was at the
moment, and not for what he has chosen to do.
An actor is responsible for the desires he possesses because his desires,
together with his beliefs, constitute who he is. But the question is not merely
whether an actor is responsible for the desires resulting in his indifference
(he is); nor whether he should feel ashamed for being so constituted (he
risk but taken it all the same as "strongly indifferent." Horder, supra note 55, at 502-03. What
Horder calls "weak indifference" and "strong indifference" correspond to what Simons calls "mild
indifference" and "modest indifference." Simons, Bad Character, supra note 46, at 264 n.93. A
weakly or mildly indifferent actor would presumably be punished for involuntary manslaughter,
whereas a strongly or modestly indifferent actor would presumably be punished for reckless
homicide. See, e.g., id. at 286 ("Some ... commentators (including this author) would indeed
extend the [cognitive counterfactual] approach to a subcategory of culpably unaware ... actors:
such actors might be punished the same as cognitively reckless actors .... (emphasis added)).
96. See, e.g., id. at 287 n.130 (identifying six conditions or criteria under which we can have
considerable confidence in our predictions). Simons would apparently permit the state to punish an
actor who unwittingly creates a lethal risk only where it can be shown that the actor actually
believed at time t1 that he would be creating a lethal risk if he were to p or fail to (p at time t2, but no
longer possesses that belief, or is no longer aware of that belief, when at time t2 he actually (ps or
fails to p, and where the interval between t1 and t2 is "very short." See id. Simons describes this set
of circumstances as a "deflationary scenario" because the actor possesses the relevant belief at time
tj but then forgets that belief at time t2. The actor's mental state therefore "deflates" between time t,
and t2. See id.
97. See, e.g., id. at 280-81 n.121 (noting that the hypothetical-choice theory "is in tension with
autonomy values" but maintaining that some compromise of those values is nonetheless worth
making).
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should); nor even whether he can fairly be reproached for being so consti-
tuted (he can be). The question is whether a liberal state can fairly punish
him--censure and condemn him through hard treatmentg-for the desires he
possesses if and when those desires happen to render him incapable of
forming a belief he should have formed, and in fact, would have formed but
for those desires. 99 Although proponents of the hypothetical-choice theory
may well disagree, in my view the answer is no. An illiberal state is free so
to punish, but a liberal state is not, at least not if it remains true to the com-
mitments defining it.
Can the hypothetical-choice theory explain why one might think
retributive punishment is warranted for Sam and Tiffany, but not for the
Williamses? Yes, but the explanation it gives is objectionable. It would
punish Sam and Tiffany because the desire blinding them to the truth was the
desire to climb higher on the social ladder, and it would withhold punishment
from the Williamses because the desire blinding them to the truth was their
love for their child and the fear of losing him. Sam and Tiffany are therefore
punished because the desire blinding them is judged blameworthy, while the
desire blinding the Williamses is judged not blameworthy. But again, a lib-
eral state should not punish an actor just because he was unlucky enough to
find himself in a situation in which his possession of a blameworthy desire
blinded him to a truth he would otherwise have seen.
III. The Culpable Failure of Doxastic Self-Control
If retributive punishment is warranted only if an actor is culpable, if
culpability consists in choosing to do wrong, and if no actor guilty of invol-
untary manslaughter chooses to do wrong, then punishment for involuntary
manslaughter is either unwarranted, or the culpability of involuntary man-
slaughter must consist in something other than the culpability of choice. But
if the culpability of an actor who unwittingly creates a lethal risk is not the
culpability of choice, then what is it the culpability of?
On the account offered here, the answer is failed self-control. 00 On this
account, an actor can fairly be held liable for involuntary manslaughter if and
98. See JOEL FEINBERG, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING AND DESERVING
95, 98 (1970) (arguing that "both the 'hard treatment' aspect of punishment and its reprobative
function must be part of the definition of legal punishment").
99. See, e.g., Robert Adams, Involuntary Sins, 94 PHIL. REV. 1, 21-22 (1985) ("[Pleople may
rightly be reproached (and therefore blamed) for involuntary as well as for voluntary moral faults,
[but] only voluntary acts and omissions are rightly punished by the state."); Angela M. Smith,
Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life, 115 ETHICS 236, 271 (2005)
(concluding that we are responsible for our intentional mental states but questioning "whether we
are open to the very same kinds of appraisals for [such states] as we are for our voluntary actions").
100. H.L.A. Hart seems to have had a similar idea in mind when he wrote:
In... [some] cases, exemplified in 'provocation' and 'diminished responsibility', if we
punish at all we punish less, on the footing that, though the accused's capacity for self-
control was not absent its exercise was a matter of abnormal difficulty. He is punished
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when he fails to exercise self-control, and more specifically, if and when he
fails to exercise doxastic self-control, at least when the actor has the capacity
to exercise such self-control and when its exercise is otherwise fair to expect.
What follows can be seen as an effort to refine and defend this basic account.
A. The Capacity for Doxastic Self-Control
Hart argued long ago that punishment was warranted only if an actor
had the capacity and a fair opportunity to conform his conduct to the re-
quirements of law.'0 ' If an actor could have done as the law demanded he do
given his capacities,'0 2 then the state would be warranted in punishing him
for failing to conform to those demands, assuming he had a fair opportunity
so to conform. Conversely, punishing him would be unfair if he lacked ei-
ther the capacity to conform or a fair opportunity to do so, in which case his
failure to conform should be excused. 0 3 If the actor has no such excuse, and
if we ask why he failed to exercise his capacity to obey, one immediate an-
swer would be that he chose not to obey. He chose instead to disobey. But
one can choose to disobey in two different ways.
First, an actor can choose to disobey not only in the minimal sense that
his will executes a desire prompting him to act in a manner inconsistent with
the law's demands to refrain from so acting, but in the more robust sense that
his will endorses or identifies with that desire. He thereby makes that desire
his own. His choice is wholehearted. 0 4 We can describe such an actor as
in effect for a failure to exercise [self-]control; and this is also involved when
punishment for negligence is morallyjustifiable.
HART, supra note 68, at 153 (second emphasis added). Michael Moore has endorsed Hart's basic
explanation for the culpability of negligence. See MOORE, supra note 62, at 591 ("Since [the
culpability of negligence] is neither the culpability of choice nor of character, it must be a distinct
form of culpability, what Hart aptly termed the culpability of unexercised capacity."). In contrast,
Sanford Kadish has argued that "our law['s]" refusal to endorse Hart's approach, which Kadish
describes as an "excuse of incapacity to know better," is "understandable" in "view of both the
practical and moral complexities [such an excuse would] raise[]." Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing
Crime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 257, 278 (1987).
101. See HART, supra note 68, at 152, 154-55 (offering various formulations of this general
principle); see also A.D. Woozley, Negligence and Ignorance, 53 PHIL. 293, 301 (1978) ("[A] man
would not be found guilty of having acted negligently, if he had no fair opportunity of avoiding
it."). Hart's principle has been described as setting forth a "minimal condition of [criminal]
liability." R.A. Duff, Choice, Character, and Criminal Liability, 12 LAW & PHIL. 345, 347 (1993).
102. HART, supra note 68, at 154.
103. This statement reflects what is commonly described as the choice theory of excuse. See,
e.g., MOORE, supra note 62, at 549-62.
104. See, e.g., MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, Identification, Decision, and Treating as a Reason, in
FACES OF INTENTION 185, 193 (1999) ("[I]dentification is a kind of decision about our desires.");
Harry Frankfurt, Identification and Wholeheartedness, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE
EMOTIONS 27, 38 (Ferdinand D. Schoeman ed., 1987) (explaining that an actor acts wholeheartedly
on the basis of a desire when that desire is "incorporated into himself by virtue of the fact that he
has it by his own will").
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having defied the law. He has, as Michael Moore has said, "not even tr[ied]
to get it right."' 05 His culpability is the culpability of defiant choice.
Second, an actor can, as in the case of defiant choice, choose to disobey
in the minimal sense that his will executes a desire prompting him to act
contrary to the law's demands, but unlike in the case of defiance, the actor's
will does not lend its endorsement to that desire or otherwise identify with it.
The actor fails to conform his conduct to the law's demands, not because he
defies the law, but rather because he fails successfully to resist the desire
prompting him to disobey. His will refuses to endorse the desire prompting
disobedience, but it nonetheless ends up doing desire's bidding. He fails
successfully to exercise self-control. His culpability is thus not the culpabil-
ity of defiance, but of weakness of will. Defiance and weakness are different
forms of the culpability of choice. 1
06
The culpability of unwitting risk-creation likewise consists in the failure
to exercise self-control. However, failing to exercise self-control can result
in an actor choosing to do something the law forbids or in his either failing to
form a belief the law (implicitly) demands he form or in his failing to be-
come aware of a belief he has already formed. In other words, self-control
can be either practical (directed toward action) or doxastic (directed toward
belief). Insofar as the culpability of involuntary manslaughter rests on an
actor's failure to exercise doxastic self-control, the actor is assumed to have
available to him at time t1 beliefs sufficient to support the formation of the
belief that p, as well as the cognitive capacity needed to form that belief. He
is also assumed to possess a standing concern for others sufficient to support
the formation of the belief that p. The problem is that countervailing desire
causes the actor then and there to lack the conative capacity needed to form
that belief, or to become aware of it if he has already formed it.
Consequently, he fails to form that belief or fails to become aware of his
having formed it.
If an actor's conative state at the time he ought to have formed the belief
that p renders him unable to form or become aware of that belief, and if
ought implies can, then an excuse would normally be in order. Yet inasmuch
as the actor also possesses the capacity for doxastic self-control, he has the
capacity to alter his conative state. He can resist the desire blocking the
beliefs formation or his becoming aware of it. If he succeeds he will,
without more, either form the belief that p or become aware of it if he has
already formed it. In other words, his capacity for doxastic self-control en-
ables him to remove the conative incapacity otherwise preventing the belief
from forming or from surfacing into awareness.
An actor's failure to exercise doxastic self-control is not reducible to
any prior choice, nor therefore is the theory described here reducible to the
105. MOORE, supra note 62, at 590.
106. See Stephen P. Garvey, Passion's Puzzle, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1677, 1727-29 (2005)
(describing the distinction between defiance and weakness in more detail).
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prior-choice theory.'0 7 First, insofar as the prior-choice theory presupposes
that the choice the actor makes is a choice to do something (or not do some-
thing when the actor is under an obligation to do something), it presupposes
that the relevant work of the will is (at least) to execute a desire resulting in
an action (or inaction), which action results in turn in the actor's subsequent
incapacity to form the belief that p. In contrast, the exercise of doxastic self-
control requires the will to perform no such work. Nor does it require the
will directly to form the belief that p. Indeed, though the will can accept or
reject the beliefs an actor forms, 0 8 it cannot directly form them. We cannot
will to believe.'0 9 Instead, doxastic self-control requires the will to alter the
actor's existing configuration of desires so as to enable the belief that p to
form or to enable that belief to reach awareness. 10
107. References to the prior-choice theory in this and the following paragraph are references to
the broad prior-choice theory, according to which the actor makes a culpable choice at time ti the
result of which is an incapacity at time t 2 to form the belief thatp.
108. See, e.g., L. JONATHAN COHEN, AN ESSAY ON BELIEF AND ACCEPTANCE 22 (1992)
("Acceptance, in contrast with belief, occurs at will."); Shute, supra note 47, at 192
("Acceptances ... engage with the will in a different way [than beliefs]. Beliefs are 'passive'.
They cannot be acquired directly through an act of will .... In contrast, acceptances are 'active':
they do respond to the will."). But cf Raimo Tuomela, Belief Versus Acceptance, 2 PHIL.
EXPLORATIONS 122, 136 (2000) ("[A]cceptance need not be intentional action, [and thus] the
differences between belief and acceptance do not boil down to the simple view that acceptance,
contrary to belief, is based on the agent's direct exercise of his will.").
109. The claim that we cannot will to believe can be interpreted as a conceptual truth or as a
contingent one. For arguments in support of the conceptual-truth interpretation, see BERNARD
WILLIAMS, Deciding to Believe, in PROBLEMS OF THE SELF 136, 148 (1973), in which it is argued
that "it is not [merely] a contingent fact that I cannot bring it about, just like that, that I believe
something... ," and Dion Scott-Kakures, On Belief and the Captivity of the Will, 53 PHIL. &
PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 77, 77 (1993), which defends "a version of the conceptual impossibility
claim." For an argument in support of the contingent-truth interpretation, see William P. Alston,
The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification, 2 PHIL. PERSPECTIVES 257, 263 (1988), in
which Alston contends that "we are not [in fact] so constituted as to be able to take up propositional
attitudes at will."
Other writers argue that we can will to believe. See, e.g., Sharon Ryan, Doxastic Compatibilism
and the Ethics of Belief 114 PHIL. STUD. 47, 70 (2003) ("If you have compatibilist intuitions, you
should deny [the] premise [that doxastic attitudes are never under our voluntary control].");
Matthias Steup, Doxastic Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontology, ACTA ANALYTICA, Summer
2000, at 25, 26 ("If we use the concept [of voluntary control] in its compatibilist sense, we get the
result that we enjoy almost unconstrained voluntary control over our doxastic attitudes."). In any
event, accepting the claim that we cannot will to believe does not necessarily force one to reject the
view that epistemic justification should be understood as a matter of forming one's beliefs in
accordance with one's epistemic duties. See, e.g., Robert Audi, Doxastic Voluntarism and the
Ethics of Belief in KNOWLEDGE, TRUTH, AND DUTY 93 (Matthias Steup ed., 2001) (arguing that the
lack of voluntary control over belief-formation "do[es] not prevent our sustaining a deontic version
of an ethics of belief'); Richard Feldman, Voluntary Belief and Epistemic Evaluation, in
KNOWLEDGE, TRUTH, AND DUTY, supra, at 77, 90 ("[D]eontological judgments about belief.., do
not imply that belief is voluntary."). But see Alston, supra, at 294 ("[W]e are ill advised to think of
epistemic justification in terms of freedom from blame for believing.").
110. Cf Jeanette Kennett & Michael Smith, Synchronic Self-Control Is Always Non-Actional,
57 ANALYSIS 123, 128 (1997) (claiming that "all exercises of synchronic self-control are non-
actional" but not "that all exercises of non-actional self-control are synchronic").
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Second, the prior-choice theory presupposes that the actor's choice
causes his incapacity and thus his ignorance. The choice is prior to the igno-
rance and the cause of it. The prior-choice theory is therefore a diachronic
theory. Indeed, one of the prior choices an actor might make is the choice
not to exercise diachronic self-control. Imagine, for example, that Ulysses
had chosen not to tie himself to the mast, thereby leaving himself unable later
to resist the Sirens' song. In contrast, the exercise of doxastic self-control is
synchronic, not diachronic. The failure to exercise such self-control does not
cause the actor's ignorance. On the contrary, because the actor already has
internal access to all the evidence he needs to form the conscious belief that
p, the successful exercise of doxastic self-control causes the actor's igno-
rance to lift, while the failure to exercise such self-control allows it to endure.
Far from being the cause of his ignorance, the actor's will is the potential
solution to it.
B. A Fair Opportunity to Exercise Doxastic Self-Control
Before an actor can fairly be punished for failing to exercise doxastic
self-control, he must not only have the capacity for such self-control, he must
also have a fair opportunity to exercise that capacity. At some point the
law's demand to exercise doxastic self-control will become an unfair
demand, and when that point is reached, an actor's failure to exercise such
self-control should be excused.
Reasonable minds can disagree on the circumstances under which the
law can and cannot fairly demand the exercise of doxastic self-control."1
Having said that, I would submit that the law can fairly demand the exercise
of doxastic self-control if and when 1) the actor either suspects that p but
does not yet believe that p (a case of nonwillful ignorance) or believes that p
but is unaware of that belief (a case of self-deception); and 2) the desire pre-
venting the formation of the belief that p, or preventing the actor from
becoming aware of that belief, is a desire the influence of which the actor
should have controlled. The first condition is cognitive (related to belief);
the second, conative (related to desire). If both of these conditions obtain,
then the actor's failure to exercise doxastic self-control is culpable, and he
can fairly be subject to retributive punishment. If either fails to obtain, then
the actor's failure to exercise such self-control is nonculpable, and he should
be excused."12
111. See, e.g., Jeremy Horder, Criminal Culpability: The Possibility of a General Theory, 12
LAW & PHIL. 193, 202-03 (1993) ("[The] key distinguishing mark [of what Horder calls the
capacity theory of criminal culpability], the insistence on the fairness of opportunities to avoid
wrongdoing (at least where morally stigmatic crimes are in issue) is ambiguous just where it
matters, namely over the question of what is 'fair' or 'unfair' about an opportunity to avoid
wrongdoing.").
112. Insofar as the beliefs available to an actor at time t, support the formation of the further
belief that the actor's conduct is creating a risk of causing death, the actor's failure to form that
belief is never in the law's eyes permissible or justifiable.
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1. The Cognitive Condition.-According to one account, an actor who
fails to exercise doxastic self-control can fairly be punished if, all else being
equal, his available background beliefs are sufficient to support the formation
of the conscious belief that p."3 But the fact that an actor's background be-
liefs are sufficient to support the formation of the conscious belief that p, and
indeed, that the actor would have formed that belief but for the existence of
some countervailing desire preventing its formation, is not yet enough to
make it fair to punish him for failing to control that desire. For although his
background beliefs should perhaps alert him to the need to exercise the self-
control it would take to form the conscious belief that p, they do not without
more in fact alert him to that need. Something more than sufficient back-
ground beliefs is required.
According to another account, an actor who fails to exercise doxastic
self-control so as to permit the formation of the belief that p can fairly be
punished if, all else being equal, the actor believes that he is imposing a risk
of causing some harm short of death." 4  He might realize his conduct is
113. Oliver Wendell Holmes appears sympathetic to this position when he writes in The
Common Law:
It is enough [for criminal liability] that... circumstances [making the conduct
dangerous] were actually known as would have led a man of common understanding to
infer from them the rest of ... the present state of things. For instance, if a workman
on a house-top at mid-day knows that the space below him is a street in a great city, he
knows facts from which a man of common understanding would infer that there were
people passing below. He is therefore bound to draw that inference .... If then, he
throws down a heavy beam into the street, he does an act which a person of ordinary
prudence would foresee is likely to cause death, or grievous bodily harm, and he is
dealt with as if he foresaw it, whether he does so in fact or not.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 46-47 (Little, Brown & Co. reprint) (Mark D.
Howe ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881); see also George P. Fletcher, The Theory of Criminal
Negligence: A Comparative Analysis, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 401, 426 (1971) ("[I]nadvertence to a risk
as well as choosing to take a particular risk might warrant the just censure of others. When the
circumstances give the actor reason to think that his conduct risks harm to another, his failure to
apprise himself of the risks latent in his conduct is culpable."). Steven Sverdlik likewise appears
sympathetic when he writes:
It might be objected... that when an act of pure negligence occurs [i.e., an act of
negligence not attributable to any prior culpable choice], the agent had no reason to
reflect morally, or therefore, to act any differently from the way she did. This, in turn,
would make the purely negligent agent seem inappropriate as a target of blame. This is
surely mistaken. If our principles or norms give us reason to do things, once we see
that they apply, they surely must give us a reason to find out if they in fact apply. A
morally conscientious agent who is committed to conforming her behavior to moral
norms, in other words, has a reason to find out if she is likely to violate one of them.
Sverdlik, supra note 69, at 142. In other words, according to Sverdlik, when the background beliefs
available to an actor at time tj support the formation of the belief that p, such that the actor need
only "reflect morally" on those background beliefs in order to form that belief, an actor who fails so
to reflect is culpable, because a "morally conscientious" agent always and everywhere has reason so
to reflect.
114. Victor Tadros might be interpreted as being at least sympathetic to this position when he
writes:
[An actor's] failure to investigate the risks where it is appropriate to do so shows only
that he has an awareness that his activity is risky to a degree and in a way that ought to
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dangerous but not realize just how dangerous. He might see a risk of some
harm but no risk of death. On this account, his awareness of the lesser risk
makes it fair to demand the exercise of doxastic self-control. An actor who
believes that he is imposing a nonlethal risk and who takes that risk without
good reason could of course fairly be punished for choosing to take that risk.
Nonetheless, though his belief that he is imposing such a risk should perhaps
alert him to the need to exercise the self-control it would take to form the
conscious belief that p, it does not without more in fact alert him to that need.
Again, something more is needed.
When would it be fair to punish an actor for failing to exercise doxastic
self-control? In my view it would, all else being equal, be fair when the actor
possesses one of two cognitive states. The first can be described as a state of
nonwillful ignorance in which the actor suspects, but does not yet believe,
that p. 1 15 The second can be described as a state of self-deception in which
the actor unconsciously believes that p but sincerely avows ignorance ofp.1
6
An actor who suspects that p, or who unconsciously believes that p, not only
should be aware of the need to exercise doxastic self-control. He is in fact
aware of that need. Such awareness is internal to each of these cognitive
states.'
17
When an actor's background beliefs are sufficient to support the
formation of the belief that p, but the actor nonetheless only suspects that p
because desire keeps him from forming the belief that p, the actor's suspicion
will nag at his consciousness until an exercise of self-control allows his sus-
picion to blossom into belief or until desire prevails and dispels the suspicion
altogether. Similarly, if the actor actually forms the belief that p, but desire
simultaneously pushes that belief into the unconscious, that unconscious be-
lief will nag at the actor's consciousness until an exercise of self-control
releases it into consciousness or until desire represses it beyond the reach of
(ordinary) self-control altogether.
a. Nonwiliful Ignorance.-Because nonwillful ignorance is related
to the better-known doctrine of willful ignorance (also known as willful
blindness), one way to explain the former is to begin with an explanation of
lead him to investigate. He need not be aware that there is a risk that the actus reus of
an offence would come about, let alone that it be the actus reus of the offence with
which he is charged.
TADROS, supra note 55, at 257 (initial emphasis added).
115. See infra notes 118-30 and accompanying text (discussing nonwillful ignorance).
116. See infra notes 131-43 and accompanying text (discussing self-deception).
117. It follows from this analysis that an actor who was so self-absorbed or indifferent to the
well being of others that he never even formed the suspicion that p or the unconscious belief that p
should not be liable for involuntary manslaughter. If this result is perverse, it seems to me that such
perversity is the price one pays for a criminal law that refuses to punish people for being unlucky
enough to find themselves in a situation in which their self-absorption or indifference prevents them
from forming beliefs they would have formed had they not been so self-absorbed or indifferent.
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the latter." 8 Willful ignorance is a familiar though controversial doctrine." 19
In its most general formulation the doctrine provides that when an offense
requires knowledge with respect to the existence of an attendant circum-
stance (call this circumstance p*)-for example, that the suitcase he is
carrying contains a controlled substance-but the actor lacks such
knowledge, the actor will nonetheless be treated under certain circumstances
as if he had such knowledge, even though he did not.
Scholars have offered at least three accounts of willful ignorance.
These accounts differ because each begins with a different analysis of the
concept of knowledge. The first account begins with the standard philoso-
phical analysis of knowledge, according to which knowledge is "justified
true belief."'' 20 On this account, the knowing actor and the willfully ignorant
actor both believe that p* (and it is true that p*), but whereas the knowing
actor's belief is justified based on the evidence internally available to him,
the willfully ignorant actor's belief is not121 Nonetheless, the willfully igno-
rant actor could easily have gathered the additional evidence needed to
transform his unjustified belief into a justified belief (and thus into
knowledge) had he chosen to do so. Insofar as he chose not to do so because
he wanted for no good reason not to know that p *, the law treats him as if he
did know.
118. The wording of willful blindness instructions in the federal courts varies among the
circuits. United States v. Alston-Graves, 435 F.3d 331, 338 (D.C. Cir. 2006). For one influential
case discussing willful ignorance, see United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 704 (9th Cir. 1976) (en
banc). The Model Penal Code's definition of willful ignorance is contained in § 2.02(7), which
provides that "[w]hen knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense,
such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence, unless he
actually believes that it does not exist." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7) (1962). For discussions of
the doctrine in English law, see ASHWORTH, supra note 38, § 5.3(e), at 191-93, and SiMESTER &
SULLIVAN, supra note 83, § 5.4(i), at 147-49.
119. Academic commentary on the willful ignorance doctrine focuses on three related
questions. First, what does it mean to say that an actor is willfully ignorant? Second, assuming an
actor who is willfully ignorant with respect to p* lacks knowledge with respect to p*, is the
culpability of an actor who is willfully ignorant with respect to p* nonetheless morally equivalent to
that of an actor who knows that p*? Third, assuming the culpability of an actor who is willfully
ignorant with respect to p* is morally equivalent to that of an actor who knows that p*, does it
nonetheless violate the principle of legality for courts to permit liability to be imposed on a willfully
ignorant actor when the offense charged requires knowledge and no statutory provision exists
defining willful ignorance as "knowledge"? My focus here is on the first question.
120. See, e.g., RICHARD FELDMAN, EPISTEMOLOGY 15 (2003) ("Philosophers often say that
what is needed for knowledge, in addition to true belief, is justification for the belief."). This
definition ignores Gettier problems. See Edmund L. Gettier, Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?,
23 ANALYSIS 121 (1963). Gettier problems involve cases in which an actor's belief is both justified
and true but nonetheless does not constitute knowledge. See id. at 121 (arguing that the claim that
"justified true belief' constitutes a "sufficient condition for the truth of the proposition that S knows
that P" is false).
121. See Douglas N. Husak & Craig A. Callender, Wilful Ignorance, Knowledge, and the
"Equal Culpability" Thesis: A Study of the Deeper Significance of the Principle of Legality, 1994
Wis. L. REV. 29, 51 ("[M]any (but not all) wilfully ignorant defendants do not possess knowledge
of the incriminating proposition p... [because such] defendants... lack[] sufficient [internal]
justification to know p.").
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The second account begins with one reading of the Model Penal Code's
§ 2.02(2) definition of knowledge. 122 On this account, an actor "knows" that
p* if he is aware that it is practically certain that p*, whereas he is reckless
with respect to p * if he is aware, not that it is practically certain that p *, but
only that a substantial risk exists that p *. 123 If an actor who is aware that p *
necessarily believes that p*, a knowing actor is one who believes that the
probability that p * is practically certain (p *practically certain), whereas a reckless
actor is one who believes that the probability that p * is substantial but not
practically certain (p*substantial). The difference between a knowing actor and
a reckless actor thus turns on the different content of their respective beliefs.
An otherwise reckless actor who could have easily gathered the additional
information needed to transform his belief that p *sbattial into the belief that
122. The Model Penal Code's definition of willful ignorance, contained in § 2.02(7), suffers
from a number of problems. See, e.g., id. at 37-39 (describing a "number of grounds" on which
§ 2.02(7) is "defective"); Michaels, supra note 48, at 983 (stating that § 2.02(7)'s "high probability
approach to deciding which cases short of actual awareness should be treated as equivalent to
knowledge has been soundly criticized"); Simons, Mental States, supra note 57, at 501 n.128
(claiming that § 2.02(7) is "an awkward statement of the wilful blindness doctrine"). For example,
the text of § 2.02(7) presupposes that an actor can at the same time believe that the probability thatp
exists is high while at the same time believing that p does not exist. But the belief that the
probability that p exists is high precludes the belief that p does not exist, or at least precludes
holding that belief rationally. See, e.g., MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 86 (1984)
(suggesting that such an actor is irrational); Larry Alexander, Lesser Evils: A Closer Look at the
Paradigmatic Justification, 24 LAW & PHIL. 611, 626 n.34 (2005) ("If someone believes it is more
likely than not the case that F exists, then he cannot believe that F does not exist."); Jonathan L.
Marcus, Note, Model Penal Code Section 2.02(7) and Willful Blindness, 102 YALE L.J. 2231, 2255
(1993) ("[Ilt is difficult to imagine how one can simultaneously be aware of a high probability that a
fact exists yet believe that it does not exist."). The discussion in the text therefore ignores § 2.02(7).
123. See, e.g., Robin Charlow, Wilful Ignorance and Criminal Culpability, 70 TEXAS L. REV.
1351, 1382 (1992) ("[lln order to 'know' one must be aware of the certainty or near certainty of a
fact, and in order to be 'reckless' one must be aware of, at most, the substantial probability of a
fact .. "); Simons, Mental States, supra note 57, at 482, 500 (stating that when
"recklessness ... refer[s] to ... a state of belief' it means a belief that one is creating a substantial
risk of causing a proscribed result or a belief that "there is a substantial risk" that an attendant
circumstance exists). Larry Alexander has recently argued that the idea of a "reckless belief' is
"incoherent," at least if one relies on the MPC's § 2.02 definition of recklessness. Alexander, supra
note 122, at 624. According to Alexander, because an actor is reckless under the Code only if he is
"conscious of an unjustified risk[,] [iun the case of beliefs, presumably, a reckless belief would be
one that the defendant both holds and is at the same consciously aware is (too) likely to be untrue."
Id. at 624-25. Thus, according to Alexander, an actor who recklessly believes that p* is one who
believes that p* while at the same time believing he should not believe that p* (because he believes
that p* is likely to be untrue). If so, then the description Alexander gives of an actor who recklessly
believes that p* is that of an actor who akratically believes that p*, i.e., the actor believes that p*
while at the same time believing that he should not (on epistemic grounds alone) believe that p*.
Whether or not such a state is conceptually incoherent, as Alexander suggests, or simply irrational,
is a matter on which one can find disagreement. Compare Johnathan E. Adler, Akratic Believing?,
110 PHIL. STUD. 1, 21 (2002) ("[T]he first-personal thought corresponding to the admission of
akratic belief would be not merely irrational, but incoherent."), and David Owens, Epistemic
Akrasia, 85 MONIST 381, 395 (2002) ("[E]pistemic akrasia is not possible."), with John Heil,
Doxastic Incontinence, 93 MIND 56, 65 (1984) ("Doxastic incontinence is reprehensible, not
because it holds out an unattainable goal, but because it is at odds with what we take to be the aims
of rational doxastic agents."), and Alfred R. Mele, Incontinent Believing, 36 PHIL. Q. 212, 217
(1986) (arguing that "full-blown incontinent believing" is possible).
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P*practically certain (and thus into knowledge) is willfully ignorant if he chose not
to do so because he wanted for no good reason not to know. Under these
circumstances the law treats him as if he did know.
The third account begins with a different reading of the Model Penal
Code's § 2.02(2) definition of knowledge. On this account, an actor "knows"
that p * if he is aware that p *. If an actor who is aware that p * necessarily
believes that p *, an actor who knows that p * is simply one who believes that
p*. In contrast, an actor who is reckless with respect to p* is one who
suspects that p * but does not yet believe that p *. The difference between the
knowing actor and the reckless actor thus turns on the different cognitive at-
titude each possesses toward p*, not on the content of p*. An otherwise
reckless actor who could easily have gathered the additional information
needed to transform his suspicion into belief (and thus into knowledge) is
willfully ignorant if he chose not to do so because he wanted for no good rea-
son not to know. 124 Under these circumstances the law treats him as if he did
know.
Despite their differences, these accounts share a common structure. The
willfully ignorant actor lacks knowledge, however that concept is analyzed,
but he could have readily done something to gather the additional evidence
needed to transform his lack of knowledge into knowledge. The actor real-
izes he could have readily gathered this additional evidence, but chooses for
no good reason not to do so. The doctrine of willful ignorance therefore
treats a non-knowing actor as if he were a knowing actor when he chooses
for no good reason willfully to defy an implicit obligation to act: to gather
additional and readily available evidence. 125 The doctrine assumes that the
nonknowing epistemic state (however characterized) in which the actor finds
himself is that which fairly triggers his duty to act. It also assumes that had
the actor discharged his duty to gather additional evidence, his lack of
124. See Husak & Callender, supra note 121, at 39-40 (arguing that an actor is willfully
ignorant with respect to p* if he suspects that p*, his suspicion is warranted, he fails to gather
additional evidence when it would be easy to do so, and he fails to gather additional evidence
because he wants not to believe that p*).
125. Alan Michaels criticizes this general account of the willful ignorance doctrine, which he
calls the "purposeful avoidance" approach, on the ground that it suffers from both overinclusiveness
and underinclusiveness. In other words, it characterizes some actors as willfully ignorant when they
should not be so characterized (and is thus overinclusive), and it fails to characterize other actors as
willfully ignorant when they should be so characterized (and is thus underinclusive). See Michaels,
supra note 48, at 986-87. The account against which Michaels judges the purposeful-avoidance
account to be over and underinclusive is what he calls the "acceptance" approach, according to
which an actor who acts when he is "merely aware that the circumstance might exist," id. at 977
(emphasis added), is treated as if he were aware that it does exist, see id. at 963, if he would still
have acted as he did if he had in fact been aware of its existence. See id. at 961; see also David
Luban, Contrived Ignorance, 87 GEO. L.J. 957, 974-75 (1999) (proposing a similar counterfactual
approach). This approach is objectionable because it punishes an actor not for what he did, but for
what he might have done if his cognitive state had been something other than what it actually was.
All in all, however, the purposeful-avoidance account of the willful ignorance doctrine seems to me
to be the most satisfactory account so far proposed.
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knowledge would be transformed into knowledge without any additional ac-
tion on his part.
Nonwillful ignorance can best be understood by contrasting it to the
third account of willful ignorance, according to which the willfully ignorant
actor suspects that p* but does not yet believe that p*. The willfully ignorant
actor does not believe that p * because he does not have internally available to
him evidence sufficient to support the formation of that belief, and chooses
for no good reason not to gather the necessary additional evidence, even
though he could easily have done so. In contrast, the nonwillfully ignorant
actor already has internally available to him all the evidence needed to form
the belief that p*. He fails to believe that p*, not because he fails to gather
more information, but simply because desire prevents him from forming that
belief. His conative state permits him to form the suspicion that p*, but it
prevents him from forming the belief that p*.
Desire can trigger a number of mechanisms that cause an actor to fail to
form a belief even though the evidence available to him supports its
formation. For example, desire might cause him to misinterpret the available
evidence and so see the world, one might say, through rose-colored
glasses. 126 It might cause his mind to focus on or attend to favorable evi-
dence and to turn away from unfavorable evidence. 27 It might cause some
of the available evidence to be more salient or vivid to him. It might cause
him to clutter his mind with other thoughts, thereby crowding out the un-
wanted belief.128 Or it might cause him to deploy exclusionary categories,
stigmatizing the offending belief as crazy, absurd, ludicrous, and so forth,
thereby keeping it from fully forming.' 29 Each of these mechanisms operates
behind the actor's back, so to speak, without the actor ever being aware of
what is going on. Consequently, whereas the willfully ignorant actor makes
a conscious choice not to know, because he makes a conscious choice not to
gather additional evidence, the nonwillfully ignorant actor makes no such
choice. His ignorance is rooted in the covert operations of desire, not in the
conscious operation of the will.
A willfully ignorant actor can transform his suspicion into belief only
through action. He must gather additional information, confirming his
suspicion that p*, and thereby transforming that suspicion into the belief that
126. See, e.g., Alfred R. Mele, Real Self-Deception, 20 BEHAv. & BRAIN SCI. 91, 94 (1997)
(discussing negative and positive misinterpretation); see also Kent Bach, An Analysis of Self-
Deception, 41 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 351, 358-60 (1981) (discussing
"rationalization").
127. See, e.g., Bach, supra note 126, at 360-61 (discussing "evasion"); Mele, supra note 126, at
94 (discussing "selective focusing/attending").
128. See, e.g., Bach, supra note 126, at 361-62 (discussing "jamming").
129. See, e.g., Kent Bach, Thinking and Believing in Self-Deception, 20 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI.
105, 105 (1997) [hereinafter Bach, Thinking and Believing] (discussing "exclusionary categories");
see also Kent Bach, Emotional Disorder and Attention, in PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 51,
61-65 (George Graham & G. Lynn Stephens eds., 1994) [hereinafter Bach, Emotional Disorder
and Attention] (same).
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p*. In contrast, a nonwillfully ignorant actor can transform his suspicion into
belief only through doxastic self-control. Rather than gather additional
evidence, he need only alter his conative constitution, changing its extant
balance of desires. He must "turn off' the desire triggering the mechanisms
preventing him from acquiring the belief that p. If he succeeds, his suspicion
will immediately ripen into belief.
The important point is that the willfully ignorant and the nonwillfully
ignorant actor both harbor a suspicion with respect to the relevant fact. This
suspicion gives the willfully ignorant actor an internal reason to gather the
additional evidence needed to support the formation of the belief that the fact
exists, and it gives the nonwillfully ignorant actor an internal reason to exer-
cise the doxastic self-control needed to allow that belief to form.
Accordingly, each actor has a fair opportunity, all else being equal, to acquire
the belief the law expects him to acquire. The failure to acquire that belief is
thus, all else being equal, a culpable failure. 130
b. Self-Deception.-Being in a state of self-deception also gives an
actor an internal reason to exercise doxastic self-control. While the correct
analysis of self-deception has been and remains the subject of ongoing
dispute, 13 1 three accounts of what it means to say a person is self-deceived
have tended to dominate the discussion. The first two accounts are for dif-
ferent reasons unsatisfactory. The third provides the needed analysis.
The first account analogizes self-deception, in which one and the same
person is both deceived and deceiver, to the more familiar case of other-
deception, in which one person is the deceived and another is the deceiver. 132
130. As I have construed it here, the willful blindness doctrine provides that if an actor is
willfully ignorant as to the existence of an attendant circumstance, the law will treat him as if he did
know of its existence, though one can question whether the culpability of a willfully ignorant actor
is the same as, or less than, that of a knowing actor. Similarly, an actor who is nonwillfully ignorant
as to the existence of a risk might, all else being equal, be fairly treated as if he were aware of that
risk, i.e., as if he were reckless, though again, one can question whether the culpability of a
nonwillfully ignorant actor is the same as, or less than, that of a reckless actor. It would in any case
be more precise to say that the nature of their culpability is different: the reckless actor's culpability
consists in choosing to impose an unjustified risk, whereas the culpability of the nonwillfully
ignorant actor consists in failing to exercise doxastic self-control when the law fairly expects such
control.
131. The philosophical literature on self-deception is surprisingly large. For helpful books or
collections dedicated to the topic, see ANNETTE BARNES, SEEING THROUGH SELF-DECEPTION
(1997); HERBERT FINGARETTE, SELF-DECEPTION (Univ. of Cal. Press 2000) (1969); M.R. HAIGHT,
A STUDY OF SELF-DECEPTION (1980); MIKE W. MARTIN, SELF-DECEPTION AND MORALITY
(1986); ALFRED R. MELE, SELF-DECEPTION UNMASKED (2001); PERSPECTIVES ON SELF-
DECEPTION (Brian P. McLaughlin & Amdlie Oksenberg Rorty eds., 1988); SELF-DECEPTION AND
PARADOXES OF RATIONALITY (Jean-Pierre Dupuy ed., 1998); SELF-DECEPTION AND SELF-
UNDERSTANDING (Mike W. Martin ed., 1985). The works of Alfred Mele and Robert Audi have
been most influential on my own thinking.
132. See, e.g., DONALD DAVIDSON, Deception and Division, in PROBLEMS OF RATIONALITY
199, 207 (2004) ("[Slelf-deception is like lying; there is intentional behaviour which aims to
produce a belief the agent does not, when he institutes the behaviour, share."); David Pears, The
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In cases of other-deception, one actor, knowing the truth that p* and acting
with the intent to deceive the other actor, causes the other actor falsely to be-
lieve that not-p*. Analogizing self-deception to other-deception therefore
means imagining that an actor, knowing the truth that p*, and acting with the
intent to deceive himself, causes himself to believe not-p* at the same time
that he believes that p*. But how, at least in the ordinary case, 133 can an actor
get himself to believe a proposition he knows is false? Moreover, how can
anyone rationally believe both p* and not-p* at the same time? The first ac-
count of self-deception thus leads to paradox and contradiction.'
1 34
The second account tries to explain self-deception without giving rise to
these problems. According to this account, an actor is self-deceived if, be-
cause he wants to believe that p*, he forms the belief that p* when the
available evidence provides greater support for the belief that not-p*. 135 An
Goals and Strategies of Self-Deception, in THE MULTIPLE SELF 59, 60 (Jon Elster ed., 1986)
("[T]he most extreme form of [irrational belief-formation] is to believe both p and not-p, which is
what is required by the full surface connotation of the word 'self-deception."'); Ralph Demos, Lying
to Oneself 57 J. PHIL. 588, 588 (1960) ("[S]elf-deception entails that B believes bothp and not-p at
the same time.").
According to Dion Scott-Kakures, the "internal irrationality" commonly associated with the
vernacular conception of self-deception is based, not on the idea that the self-deceived actor
simultaneously holds contradictory beliefs, but rather on the idea that he simultaneously believes
that p* (because he wants to believe that p*) and that he should not (presumably on epistemic
grounds alone) believe that p*. See Dion Scott-Kakures, Self-Deception and Internal Irrationality,
56 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 31, 44 (1996) ("[T]he internal irrationality of self-deception
would appear to be a matter of an agent's coming to believe that not-p (and somehow getting
himself to believe it) while believing that he ought not to believe it."). Other writers would
probably characterize such an actor as epistemically akratic or incontinent, not self-deceived. See,
e.g., ALFRED R. MELE, IRRATIONALITY: AN ESSAY ON AKRASIA, SELF-DECEPTION, AND SELF-
CONTROL 112-13 (1987) (setting forth an analysis of "strict incontinent belief').
133. One can of course construct cases in which an actor sets out with the intent to get himself
to believe a proposition he knows to be false, and indeed, manages to induce the false belief. But
these cases do not represent "garden variety" cases of self-deception. See MELE, supra note 131, at
16-17 ("Intentionally deceiving oneself is unproblematically possible[, but these] ... cases are
remote from garden-variety self-deception."). Cases of this sort typically depict an actor who,
realizing at time t, that p* is false, not only sets out at time t to cause himself to believe that p* at
time t2. They also depict the actor as setting out to cause himself to forget at time t2 that he had
intentionally induced the belief that p*, or as one who was aware at time t, that he would be likely
to forget at time t2 that he had intentionally induced that belief. See id. at 16-17 (describing a
"forgetful prankster" who intentionally writes false diary entries in order to deceive himself in the
future).
134. In an effort to dispel the paradox, proponents of this account typically postulate that the
mind is divided or partitioned in some way such that the desired belief resides in one part of the
mind and the undesired belief resides in another part. See, e.g., DAVIDSON, supra note 132, at 211
("[P]eople can and do sometimes keep closely related but opposed beliefs apart. To this extent we
must accept the idea that there can be boundaries between parts of the mind .... "); Pears, supra
note 132, at 70 ("[T]he line dividing [the deceiving subject] from [the object of deception] ... is
functional insulation."). Davidson emphasizes that in speaking of the "mind as being partitioned,
[he] mean[t] no more than that a metaphorical wall separated the beliefs which, allowed into
consciousness together, would destroy at least one." Donald Davidson, Who Is Fooled?, in SELF-
DECEPTION AND PARADOXES OF RATIONALITY, supra note 131, at 8.
135. This account of self-deception is prominently associated with the work of Alfred Mele.
For the most complete defense of this view, see MELE, supra note 13 1. Shorter versions of Mele's
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actor is thus self-deceived when, though the evidence available to him does
not support the belief that p*, the actor nonetheless believes that p* because
he wants to believe that p*. One problem with this account is that it fails to
explain the psychic tension an actor experiences when self-deceived. It de-
picts the self-deceived actor as blissfully ignorant of the truth, with nothing
about his cognitive state giving him any reason to question or doubt his belief
thatp*. But if some such psychic tension or anxiety is indeed part of the pre-
analytic phenomenon of self-deception, 136 then any account leaving it unex-
plained is, all else being equal, an inadequate account. Indeed, one might say
that such an account offers an analysis of self-caused deception 137 or perhaps
wishful thinking,1 38 but not yet an analysis of self-deception.
139
account are also available. See generally Alfred R. Mele, Emotion and Desire in Self-Deception, in
PHILOSOPHY AND THE EMOTIONS 163 (Anthony Hatzimoysis ed., 2003); Mele, supra note 123. For
what seem to be materially similar accounts, see BARNES, supra note 131, at 117, which sets forth
necessary and sufficient conditions for "self-deceiving oneself," and Ariela Lazar, Deceiving
Oneself or Self-Deceived? On the Formation of Beliefs "Under the Influence, " 108 MIND 265, 265
(1999), which argues that "self-deceptive beliefs are direct expressions of the subject's wishes, fears
and hopes."
136. See, e.g., ROBERT AUDI, Self-Deception, Rationalization and the Ethics of Belief in
MORAL KNOWLEDGE AND ETHICAL CHARACTER 131, 152 (1997) ("[Self-deception] tends to be an
unstable condition and to exist only so long as there is a balance between the pressure of the
evidence.., and the strength of the defenses maintaining the veil that camouflages that knowledge
from consciousness."); Mike W. Martin, Self-Deceiving Intentions, 20 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCd. 122,
123 (1997) ("[A]lthough self-deception does not involve fully conscious contradictory beliefs,
typically it does involve a cognitive conflict."); Scott-Kakures, supra note 132, at 49 ("[T]hough
intuitions differ ... epistemic tension, instability and fragility seems to me quite fundamental to
self-deception."). Mele maintains that any such tension should not be included among the necessary
conditions for being self-deceived. MELE, supra note 131, at 52-53.
137. See Robert Audi, Self-Deception vs. Self-Caused Deception: A Comment on Professor
Mele, 20 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 104, 104 (1997) (arguing that self-caused deception is different
from self-deception).
138. See Scott-Kakures, supra note 132, at 36-37 (arguing that Mele's purported analysis of
self-deception is in fact an analysis of wishful thinking).
139. How one distinguishes wishful thinking (or believing) from self-deception depends on
one's analysis of self-deception. Some who adopt the first account described in the text, according
to which self-deception consists in simultaneously believing p* and not-p*, when the available
evidence supports the belief that p*, maintain that self-deception involves an actor believing that p*,
either because he wants to believe that p*, or because (oddly enough) he does not want to believe
that p*, whereas wishful thinking is limited to the former case. Wishful thinking is therefore
conceived of as a subset of self-deception. See, e.g., DAVIDSON, supra note 132, at 206 (drawing a
distinction between wishful thinking, in which the belief is always welcome or positive, and self-
deception, in which the belief "may be painful"). But see MELE, supra note 131, at 4 (describing
the former case as a case of "straight" self-deception, and the latter as a case of "twisted" self-
deception).
Some who adopt the second account of self-deception described in the text, according to which
self-deception consists in believing thatp* because one wants to believe thatp*, when the available
evidence supports the belief that not-p*, maintain that wishful thinking consists in believing that p*
because one wants to believe that p*, when the available evidence supports neither the belief that p*
nor the belief that not-p*. See, e.g., MELE, supra note 131, at 74 ("[W]ishful thinkers may
encounter weaker counterevidence than self-deceivers." (citation omitted)); Bela Szabados, Wishful
Thinking and Self-Deception, 33 ANALYSIS 201, 205 (1973) (claiming that the self-deceiver "has
good grounds" for the belief he does not want to believe, whereas the "wishful thinker does not
have such grounds").
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The third account answers this objection. On this account, an actor is
self-deceived if the evidence available to him not only supports the formation
of the belief that p*, but he in fact forms that belief. The actor is self-
deceived because, though he believes that p*, he holds that belief
unconsciously, 140 and he holds that belief unconsciously because he does not
want to be aware or conscious of it. The desire not to believe that p* triggers
various mechanisms that prevent the belief from rising to the surface. 141
Accordingly, we sometimes say that the self-deceived actor knows the truth
"in his heart."' 142 Nonetheless, the self-deceived actor would, if asked, sin-
cerely avow that he possesses no belief that p*, or perhaps even that he
believes that not-p*. Because he unconsciously believes that p* while at the
same time consciously avowing no belief that p*, or a belief that not-p*, the
self-deceived actor, unlike the actor in a state of self-caused deception, does
experience the psychic tension commonly associated with self-deception.
143
Finally, some who adopt the third account of self-deception described in the text, according to
which self-deception consists in simultaneously avowing that not-p* and unconsciously believing
that p*, when the available evidence supports the belief that p*, maintain that wishful thinking
consists in believing that p* when the available evidence supports the belief that not-p* (which is
what proponents of the second account would describe as self-deception). See, e.g., COHEN, supra
note 108, at 144 ("[I1n ordinary wishful thinking we not only... desire thatp and, as a result, come
to think that p: we are all the more able.., to come to think that p because we do not have a[n
unconscious] belief that not-p.").
140. The state of unconsciousness intended here is that of modest unawareness, not deep
unawareness. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text (describing the distinction between
modest and deep unawareness).
141. See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text (describing some of these mechanisms).
Desire has also been said to be able to trigger so-called "cold" or unmotivated cognitive biases or
heuristics, such as the "confirmation bias" and the "availability heuristic," see MELE, supra note
131, at 28-29, with respect to which legal scholars have recently devoted considerable attention.
The standard citation in the psychological literature regarding such biases and heuristics is RICHARD
NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL
JUDGMENT (1980). For a more recent account of the relevant literature, see HEURISTICS AND
BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).
142. MILO, supra note 89, at 114. See also Bach, Thinking and Believing, supra note 129, at
105 ("In self-deception, unlike blindness or denial, the truth is dangerously close at hand."); Scott-
Kakures, supra note 132, at 32 ("An agent who is self-deceived somehow knows better.").
143. This account of self-deception is prominently associated with the work of Robert Audi.
See, e.g., AUDI, supra note 136; Robert Audi, Self-Deception, Rationalization, and Reasons for
Acting, in PERSPECTIVES ON SELF-DECEPTION, supra note 131, at 92; Robert Audi, Self-Deception
and Rationality, in SELF-DECEPTION AND SELF-UNDERSTANDING, supra note 131, at 169; Robert
Audi, Epistemic Disavowals and Self-Deception, 57 PERSONALIST 378 (1976); Robert Audi, Self-
Deception and Practical Reasoning, 19 CAN. J. PHIL. 246 (1989). Others have advanced what seem
to be materially similar accounts. See COHEN, supra note 108, at 142 ("[The] self-
deceiver ... consciously accepts that p, [but he] does not consciously believe that not-p."); Bach,
supra note 126, at 364-65 (claiming that the self-deceived actor believes that p but "avoid[s] the
sustained or recurrent thought of p"); Jos6 Luis Bermfidez, Defending Intentionalist Accounts of
Self-Deception, 20 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 107, 107 (1997) (describing the self-deceived actor as one
who "sincerely affirm[s] p and yet [has] an inferentially insulated belief that not-p"); Herbert
Fingarette, Self-Deception Needs No Explaining, 48 PHIL. Q. 289, 296 (1998) (arguing that the self-
deceiver "secretly" knows the truth "in [his] heart" or "deep down" but that the truth "is, in a crucial
way, a secret even from [him]self').
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This tension in turn gives him an internal reason to exercise doxastic self-
control.
Self-deception so conceived can be understood as the mirror image of
nonwillful ignorance. In cases of nonwillful ignorance the actor's desire not
to believe that p* prevents (through various mechanisms) him from forming
the belief that p*, although it does not succeed in preventing him from sus-
pecting that p*. Doxastic self-control is needed to check desire's influence
so as to allow the belief to form, lest desire eventually prevail and cause the
actor's suspicion itself to evaporate. In contrast, in cases of self-deception
the actor's desire not to believe that p* does not prevent the formation of the
belief that p*, but it does prevent (again through various mechanisms) that
belief from rising to the requisite level of awareness. Doxastic self-control is
needed to allow the unconscious belief to come to the surface, lest desire
eventually prevail and push it ever deeper into the unconscious.
2. The Conative Condition.-All else being equal, an actor who, due to
the causal influence of desire, fails to form the conscious belief that p can
fairly be expected to exercise doxastic self-control so as to form that belief,
provided he either suspects that p or unconsciously believes that p. In addi-
tion to this cognitive condition, however, a conative condition must also be
met. For an actor's failure to control some ignorance-causing desires is
culpable, but his failure to control other ignorance-causing desires is
excusable. The best way to explain this condition is to examine the defense
of duress. 1
44
Duress is commonly portrayed as an excuse based on the principle that
an actor should be excused if and because he lacked a "fair opportunity" to
conform his conduct to the law's demands. 145 An actor who acts under du-
ress chooses to do that which the law prohibits. He could have chosen
instead to conform his conduct to the law's demands. He had the capacity so
to conform, but he chose not to exercise that capacity. The law nonetheless
recognizes that under certain circumstances it would be unfair to expect an
144. The discussion in the text focuses on the content or object of the ignorance-causing desire.
If the strength of the desire, whatever its content or object, can fairly be characterized as compulsive
or irresistible, then the actor should be excused for failing to control its influence on his beliefs, just
as an actor should be excused for failing to control the influence of such a desire on his action. But
cf 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 173(e)(1), at 83 (Supp. 2006-2007) ("[A]
number of jurisdictions ... have either declined to adopt an insanity defense that provides an excuse
on the basis of control impairment or ... have revised their insanity defense to eliminate an excuse
based on control impairment.").
145. See Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress." Justifying the Excuse and Searching
for Its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1365 (1989) ("A person acting under duress is
excused, although he possessed the capacity to make the right choice, if he lacked a fair opportunity
to act lawfully or, slightly more accurately, if he lacked a fair opportunity to avoid acting
unlawfully."). In rare instances duress may also function as an incapacity excuse. See R.A. Duff,
Rule- Violations and Wrongdoings, in CRIMINAL LAW THEORY, supra note 47, at 47, 64 ("[In some
cases of duress, we] wish, and he wishes, that he could have resisted [the threat] (giving in was not
justified): but he could not-his 'will' was 'overborne."').
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actor to choose conformity over disobedience. The law recognizes that under
some circumstances it cannot fairly insist that an actor live up to the demands
it imposes. Accordingly, under these circumstances the law offers duress as
an excuse.
Duress is commonly portrayed as an excuse, but it might better be
portrayed as a special form of justification or permission. 146 On this view,
the law's own norms of permissible conduct do not allow the actor to act as
he does, despite the duress under which he labors. The law expects him to
conform. At the same time, however, the law condescends or defers to some
other set of norms according to which the actor's conduct is permissible.
Whatever the source and content of these norms-agent-relative moral
norms, 147 role norms, 14 8 social norms149-they permit the actor to act as he
146. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 62, at 561 (arguing that the unfair opportunity branch of the
choice theory of excuse "could be called the 'failed justification' idea of excuse"); ALAN
WERTHEIMER, COERCION 168 (1987) (explaining duress as an "agent-relative" justification); Larry
Alexander, A Unified Excuse of Preemptive Self-Protection, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1475, 1495
(1999) (explaining duress as a "personal" justification "reflecting the moral permissibility of a
defendant's giving more weight in the moral calculus to his and his family's interests than those
interests would be given from an impersonal perspective"); Claire 0. Finkelstein, Duress: A
Philosophical Account of the Defense in Law, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 251, 280 (1995) [hereinafter
Finkelstein, Duress] (duress as agent-relative justification); Claire Finkelstein, Excuses and
Dispositions in Criminal Law, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 317, 320 (2002) (arguing that "rational
excuses" involve "cases where the agent acts for personal reasons, rather than for... impersonal
considerations of social welfare"); Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of
Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 337 (1996) (duress as agent-relative
justification); Robert F. Schopp, Justification Defenses and Just Convictions, 24 PAC. L.J. 1233,
1311 (1993) (duress as justification under "conventional social morality"); see also Craig L. Carr,
Duress and Criminal Responsibility, 10 LAW & PHIL. 161, 183 (1991) (arguing that duress provides
a defense in "those extraordinary cases that involve disobedience to law in response to a moral
dilemma"); Dressier, supra note 145, at 1354-55 (arguing that an agent-relative theory of duress is
"plausible[, but that even] if it is accepted, it would have rather limited applicability"); John
Gardner, The Gist of Excuses, I BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 575, 597-98 (1998) (arguing that the gist of
an excuse, including that of duress, is that one has "lived up to" the applicable standards of
character based on some conception of appropriate role); Stephen J. Morse, Excusing and the New
Excuse Defenses: A Legal and Conceptual Review, 23 CRIME & JUST. 329, 341 (1998) ("Deciding
which choices are too hard, that is, which threats might cause a person of reasonable firmness to
yield and to do wrong [and thus be excused on the basis of duress], is of course a normative matter."
(emphasis added)). But see Peter Westen & James Mangiafico, The Criminal Defense of Duress: A
Justification, Not an Excuse-And Why It Matters, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 833, 914 (2003)
(claiming that an actor who validly claims duress is justified in the eyes of the law because he has
"conformed to what the law ultimately regards as minimally acceptable conduct" (emphasis
added)). For a brief, but in my view, effective critique of the Westen-Mangiafico thesis, see
Mitchell N. Berman, Justification and Excuse, Law and Morality, 53 DUKE L.J. 1, 72-73 (2003).
147. See, e.g., Finkelstein, Duress, supra note 146, at 280 ("[W]here the [actor's] reason for
violating the [law's] prohibitory norm is agent-relative, that is, identified by its connection to the
interests of the person whose reason it is, we demand only acceptance and understanding as a basis
for exoneration." ); Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 146, at 337 (arguing that the norms governing
the availability of duress are agent-relative).
148. See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 146, at 593 (arguing that the availability of duress as a
defense should "vary... according to the standards applicable to roles which the defendant
occupies").
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does and to satisfy the desire he seeks to satisfy in so acting, even though the
law's own norms extend no such permission. So, for example, prevailing
social norms might permit a woman to commit armed robbery in the face of a
threat to injure her child if she refused, even if the law's own norms of per-
missible conduct would not. 150 In other words, prevailing social norms might
permit the woman to satisfy her desire to save her child's life, even if the
law's own norms would not.
Although the law commonly says when it will not entertain a claim of
duress-when, for example, the actor kills to avoid the threatened harm 51 or
when the threat comes from a source other than a human being 5 2 -it
otherwise delegates to the trier of fact the task of judging when a claim of
duress should prevail. For example, the Model Penal Code asks the trier of
fact to decide whether a "person of reasonable firmness" in the actor's situa-
tion would have done as the actor did. 153  If the trier of fact decides that
prevailing standards of reasonableness would have permitted the actor to act
as he did, then punishing him for so acting would be unfair, and accordingly,
he should be excused, even though he acted impermissibly according to the
law's own norms of permissible conduct.
The law sometimes imposes demands that are too hard to satisfy. It
sometimes asks us to control desires we cannot fairly or reasonably be
expected to control. If an actor fails to control these desires and instead
endorses and executes those desires in action, the law does not condone his
failure. The law does not permit the woman to commit armed robbery, de-
149. See, e.g., Dressier, supra note 145, at 1334 ("[An] actor should be excused [on grounds of
duress] only if he attained or reflected society's legitimate expectations of moral strength."
(emphasis added)); Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 146, at 337 (arguing that the norms governing
the availability of duress are "social norms that define the legitimate love of one's own" (emphasis
added)).
150. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 146, at 333 (describing such a case as one in which
the actor "can assert duress").
151. See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 56, at § 23.01[B], at 297.
152. See id. § 23.01[B], at 298. Although the Model Penal Code's formulation of the duress
defense, like that of the common law, requires the threat to come from a human being, it rejects the
common law's refusal to allow a defendant to claim duress to a charge of murder. See MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.09 (1962). For an even broader formulation than that of the Code, according to
which an actor should be excused whenever he "committed [the crime] to avoid harm to himself or
others, and a 'person of reasonable firmness' in the defendant's situation would have committed the
crime," see Alexander, supra note 146, at 1494.
153. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (1962). To be more precise, the Model Penal Code
formulation of duress asks whether a "person of reasonable firmness in [the actor's] situation would
have been unable to resist." Id. (emphasis added). The Code therefore tries uncomfortably to
combine in its formulation of the defenses duress-as-an-incapacity excuse and duress-as-a-no-fair-
opportunity excuse, inasmuch as it makes the defense available only when the threat facing the actor
would have rendered a person of reasonable firmness unable to resist. Cf Dressier, supra note 145,
at 1367 n. 195 (noting that the Code "seems to treat duress as an incapacity-oriented excuse"). As a
no-fair-opportunity excuse, duress would be available if a reasonable person in the actor's situation
would not have resisted in the face of the threat directed toward the actor. As an incapacity excuse,
duress would be available if the actor was unable to resist in the face of the threat directed toward
him.
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spite the threat to her child. It continues to insist that her conduct was
impermissible and that she should have exercised control over the desire
prompting her to act, even if under prevailing norms of reasonableness the
exercise of such self-control would have been saintly or supererogatory.1 54
At the same time, the law itself recognizes that its demands are sometimes
too much to bear, and when they are, that it should excuse, but not condone,
an actor's failure to bear them.
Duress excuses an actor for acting contrary to the law's demands, but
the logic of duress extends beyond action to belief. An actor should be ex-
cused for failing to exercise doxastic self-control, such that he ends up failing
to form the conscious belief that p when the available evidence otherwise
supports the formation of that belief, if and because demanding such self-
control would, as in the case of an action chosen under duress, be an unfair
demand to make. In other words, although the law itself expects us to con-
trol any and all desires causing us to fail to form the conscious belief that p
when the available evidence supports the formation of that belief, it should
nonetheless recognize that failing to control the influence of some desires on
belief constitutes a failure it ought to excuse, just as it recognizes through the
doctrine of duress that failing to control the influence of some desires on ac-
tion constitutes a failure it ought to excuse.
Which desires the law should excuse an actor's failure to control will
depend on the norms to which it defers, and when it is prepared to defer to
them. When the identity or application of those norms is indeterminate or
controversial, the availability of duress will likewise be indeterminate or
controversial. Consider again the case of Walter and Bernice Williams.
Their claim to the contrary notwithstanding, assume they did believe their
son's life would be in danger if they did nothing but give him aspirin. If the
reason they did nothing but give him aspirin was their desire not to risk los-
ing him to the welfare authorities, was their failure to act, though
impermissible, nonetheless excusable? Would prevailing norms of
reasonableness have permitted the Williamses to do nothing under the
circumstances, other than give aspirin?
The welfare authorities were, at least so far as the Williamses were
concerned, issuing a threat: Don't take your child to see a doctor, because if
you do, we might take your child away from you. But should a parent ever
be allowed to risk a child's life in order to avoid a risk of losing the child?
What if the Williamses believed the risk of death was very small but the risk
of losing him almost certain? Would that make a difference? Does the state,
154. See, e.g., Duff, supra note 145, at 66 ("[W]hat citizens should ideally do is more than we,
or the law, can properly demand that they do, on pain of condemnation if they do not; and that is
why, whilst we do not regard such an agent's action as justified, we excuse her."); Berman, supra
note 146, at 73 ("[T]he law could conceive of its own substantive, action-directing norms as
sometimes demanding something closer to moral heroism."); Dressler, supra note 145, at 1367
(implying that the law sometimes demands "[]saintly moral strength" (emphasis omitted)).
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being the source of the perceived threat, lose its standing to punish? If the
answers to these questions prompt disagreement, as they doubtless will, the
source of that disagreement resides in the indeterminacy of the norms gov-
erning when we are prepared to say that the choice facing an actor is or is not
unfair.
The same indeterminacy spills over into the real case. The Williamses
claimed not to have believed their inaction placed their son's life at risk. If
they nonetheless suspected they were placing his life at risk, or if they un-
consciously believed they were placing his life at risk, it would not, all else
being equal, have been unfair to expect them to control the desire blinding
them to the truth. But all else is not equal. For if their failure to exercise
self-control, and thus their failure to realize the risk, was due to their desire
not to chance losing their child, would it be unfair to expect a parent to con-
trol such a desire? Here is where the indeterminacy enters. If it would not
have been unfair to expect such control, then the Williamses were rightly
convicted of involuntary manslaughter. But if it would have been unfair,
then although they could have controlled that desire, and although the law's
own norms would have demanded such control, their failure to do so would
nonetheless be a failure the law should excuse.
The case of Sam and Tiffany is not nearly so difficult. In their case the
desire causing them to be blind to the lethal risk facing their child-the
desire to climb higher on the social ladder-was stronger than it should have
been. Indeed, we know it was stronger than it should have been precisely
because it prevented them from seeing the risk to their son's life.
Consequently, assuming they either suspected their child's life was in danger
or unconsciously believed it was in danger, then they can fairly be punished
for failing to control that desire. They are not punished for some prior culpa-
ble choice they may or may not have made. Nor are they punished for
possessing a blameworthy desire blinding them to the truth. Instead, they are
punished for failing to control that desire when they could and fairly should
have controlled it.
IV. Conclusion
When the law legitimately imposes retributive punishment on an actor
for involuntary manslaughter, it does so not because he made some prior cul-
pable choice causing him later to be ignorant. Nor does it punish him for
some hypothetical choice he might have made if, contrary to fact, he had be-
lieved he was risking another's life. Instead, it punishes him if and because
he failed to exercise doxastic self-control over the influence of his desires on
his belief when he could and fairly should have exercised such self-control.
An actor's desires sometimes make it impossible for him then and there
to form the conscious belief that he is risking another's life. Yet insofar as
he retains the capacity to alter the balance of his competing desires, he is
obliged to exercise that capacity, thereby permitting the risk confronting him
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to come clearly into focus, provided he either suspects the risk exists or else
unconsciously believes it exists, and provided too that the desire blinding
him to the risk is a desire he should have controlled. If these conditions
obtain, and the actor nonetheless fails to exercise such self-control, he is a
fair candidate for retributive punishment. He not only could have controlled
the ignorance-causing desire, but demanding the exercise of that capacity
would be a fair demand to make.
When an actor freely and wholeheartedly chooses to do that which he
knows the law demands he not do, he can be said willfully to defy the law.
He willfully disobeys. He symbolically sets himself above the law. The
immediate aim of retributive punishment directed at such an offender is to
humble his defiant will, although ideally the offender will come to embrace
his punishment as part of the price he must pay to make amends for his
defiance. Having paid that price he will have earned forgiveness and the
right to rejoin the community from whom he has separated himself through
the commission of the offense. 155 He will have atoned for his crime.
An actor guilty of involuntary manslaughter does not defy the law. He
cannot defy it because he does not see the risk he is taking, and if he does not
see the risk he is taking, he cannot know that the risk is one the law demands
he not take. The hardship imposed on such an actor is thus imposed, not to
punish him for defiance, but rather to censure him for weakness, for failing to
control the desire causing his blindness when he could have exercised such
control, and when the demand for its exercise was fair to make. It should
also, and perhaps more importantly, teach him how better to exercise his ca-
pacity for doxastic self-control and so become less vulnerable to the power of
ignorance-causing desire.
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155. For a more detailed explanation of the ideas contained in this paragraph, see generally
Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1801 (1999).
156. Cf Robert Merrihew Adams, The Virtue of Faith, 3 FAITH & PHIL. 3, 5 (1984) ("The
purpose of identifying cognitive failures as sins is not to find a stick to beat the sinner, but rather to
learn of what we have to repent of.").
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